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ABSTRACT
This study explores the concept of manned-unmanned teaming in the context of the joint
capability areas and investigates the expanded kill chain for a manned and unmanned team
for future strike operations. The study first elucidated capabilities that can be realized
by manned-unmanned teams. A design reference mission for a manned-unmanned team
(strike) operation was developed, enabling operational activity and functional analysis of
the expanded kill chain. Simulation models were built to examine the time-efficiencies of
the manned-unmanned teaming concept. This research used insights from the results of the
models to explore alternatives in asset generation and systems link-up tactics. The anal-
ysis of strike operations cycle times that include total mission operations time, airborne
time, and time to complete systems link-up provided data to generate recommendations.
Besides identifying areas on which to focus efficiency improvement efforts, this study also
proposes tactics and concept of operations to enhance the effectiveness of strike opera-
tions by manned-unmanned teams. This study reveals that fighter endurance is a limiting
factor in manned-unmanned operations and proposes a synchronized launch or pre-launch
establishment of communications and datalink as possible ways to mitigate these limiting
factors.
v
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Executive Summary
Traditionally, reconnaissance missions used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In recent
operations, UAVs have been used for dedicated strike operations against surface targets.
Recent advances made in swarming UAVs present the opportunities to integrate a swarming
UAV system with manned fighters to realize capabilities that traditionally were realized by
manned aircraft. A network of UAVs having an organic capability to self-organize and
collaborate through information sharing and collective sense-making to achieve a common
objective is called a swarm UAV network. The teaming of manned and unmanned aircraft
could be a disruptive technology in future combat.
This study identified the capabilities realized by a swarming UAV system teamed with
manned aircraft based on the joint capability areas framework. These capabilities were
mapped back to the framework, ensuring that the identified capabilities are relevant to
the current capability requirements. The manned-unmanned teaming for a surface strike
mission was among the potential capabilities identified for further investigation. A de-
sign reference mission for a strategic surface strike executed by a manned-unmanned strike
package was developed. The design reference mission included a description of the sce-
nario, an elaboration on the threats and analysis and mapping of the operational activities
and functions.
A kill chain is a sequence of activities, that when executed successfully in the prescribed
sequence, leads to the destruction of an objective or target. Traditionally, the kill chain only
specifies the final phases of target location, identification, designation and engagement. In
this study, an expanded kill chain was developed to include asset generation, manned and
unmanned communications establishment (link-up) and the ingress and egress processes.
The basic kill chain and the expanded kill chain are then modeled using Imagine That Inc.’s
ExtendSim 9.0, a discrete event simulation software. ExtendSim enables the modeling
of simulation items that are generated and processed by discrete activities as the items
travel through the model along a defined path. Activity blocks along the path simulate the
performance of service or impose delays on the items. Researchers assign attributes to each
simulation item to facilitate the understanding of the behavior and traits of the item as it
moves through the model.
xix
Measures of effectiveness are selected to assess the limiting factors of the expanded kill
chain. The measures of effectiveness are Total Mission Time, Mission Time and ren-
dezvous time. Total Mission Time measures the time from the beginning of asset gen-
eration to the time the strike package completes the return to the launch platforms. Mission
time measures the total time the assets are airborne. Rendezvous time measures the time it
takes for the strike package to form up. In this study, a manned-unmanned teaming strike
package is defined as a flight of four manned fighters and eight unmanned combat aerial
vehicles. For the basic kill chain, mission success rate, defined as the percentage of targets
destroyed, is identified as the single measure of effectiveness.
For the basic kill chain model, analysis is focused on the main effects from the probabil-
ities of success for the respective kill chain processes. The analysis found that whilst the
probability of hit and probability of kill had some effect on the mission success rate, the
probability of a correct target solution had the largest effect on the mission success rate.
For the expanded kill chain model, analysis is focused on identifying the main effects from
the various processes in the expanded kill chain. The results from the expanded kill chain
model suggests that the limiting factor in a manned-unmanned teaming strike package lies
in the airborne formation of the strike package. From the simulation, a significant amount
of time is spent either by the fighter or by the unmanned combat aerial vehicle holding at
the rendezvous point. In the simulation, there is no attempt to synchronize the generation
of the manned and unmanned aircraft. As a result, if a manned aircraft reaches the ren-
dezvous point first and there are no unmanned aircraft for it to perform the link-up, the
result is that the manned aircraft has to hold at the rendezvous point and wait for the ar-
rival of the unmanned aircraft. This unsynchronized arrival at the rendezvous points creates
inefficiencies and also results in precious airborne time wasted. The study then proposes
three alternatives that aim either to extend the endurance of the manned fighters or to min-
imize the Mission Time through synchronization or changes in the activity sequence in the
expanded kill chain.
The three alternatives include the use of aerial refueling tankers to extend the endurance
of the manned fighters, the deliberate synchronization of aircraft launches to enable the
realization of “just-in-time” arrival of aircraft at the rendezvous point, and the establish-
ment of communications link-up between manned and unmanned aircraft prior to launch.
xx
Analysis of all alternatives is performed to gain insights into the effects each had on the
Mission Time and rendezvous (RV) Time. Benefits and challenges of each alternative are
also detailed. Finally, the Pugh method, utilizing the Pugh matrix, is used to determine
which of the alternative amongst the three is most suitable. The analysis of alternatives
reveals that while the synchronization of aircraft launches results in a significant reduction
in RV Times, it still necessitates a operations time that is longer than the manned fighter’s
endurance. Consequently, for this alternative, the requirement for aerial refueling is still
required. On the other hand, performing the communications link-up between manned and
unmanned aircraft prior to launch removed the RV Time from the calculation of Mission
Time. As a result, a reduction of two hours from the original operations time was achieved,
making it possible to execute the manned-unmanned teaming strike operation without the
requirement of aerial refueling tankers. However, a pre-launch link-up would require sta-
tioning both launch platforms at a closer proximity due to line-of-sight communications
requirements, with a consequent increase in risk to both launch platforms.
With the increasing use of UAVs in military operations, coupled with the advent of swarm
technology for a network of UAVs, the teaming of manned and unmanned aircraft for sur-
face strike missions in contested airspace presents a potential disruptive capability against
any adversary. This study illuminates areas in the expanded kill chain of such a strike oper-
ation that may impact the operational effectiveness. It identifies possible tactics, concept of
operations and future capabilities that will increase the operational tenability of a manned
and unmanned aircraft for strike operations.
xxi
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The ability to inflict damage and destruction on one’s enemy remains one of the key ca-
pabilities of military operations. The employment of UAVs in military operations opens
up new possibilities in strike capabilities. At present, strike operations are separated into
distinct unmanned and manned aircraft operations and therein lay the possibility of team-
ing both manned and unmanned systems for strike operations. This study investigates the
capabilities realized from this teaming and, through an analysis of the expanded kill chain
of a future strike operation, identifies the potential limiting factors in the employment of
the concept.
1.1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Balloons were the first UAVs. They were first used in a reconnaissance role in air warfare.
These balloons, launched into enemy territory, provided the forces with an advantageous
“birds-eye view” over the battlefield. In his book [1], Air Marshal Joubert of the Royal
Air Force spoke to the use of balloons as the first vehicles for airborne reconnaissance and
balloons were first used by the Royal Air Force in military operations in Sudan in 1885 [2].
During the American Civil War and the First World War, balloons were also employed as
reconnaissance platforms [3]. In the Second World War, the Japanese launched balloons
loaded with explosives in their attempt to attack American infrastructures and agricultural
land [4], though the effectiveness of such balloons were dismal. Despite the many attempts
to employ the use of unmanned flying platforms as instruments of war, the early use of
unmanned flying platforms was hampered mainly by the lack of technology for launch and
control.
UAVs became more effective during the Vietnam War when the United States (U.S.) began
employing them for daytime reconnaissance missions. The scope of the missions later ex-
panded into night photography, communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intel-
ligence (ELINT), propaganda, target drones, and the detection, identification and location
of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
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Since then, the use of unmanned aerial systems have evolved and expanded rapidly over
the past decade. While the primary role of UAVs has traditionally been in intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), the use of unmanned aerial systems in other do-
mains is growing vis-a-vis the capability growth of UAVs. The “Initial Capabilities Docu-
ment for Unmanned Systems (Air, Ground, and Maritime)” [5] articulated the capability of
unmanned systems to provide persistent relief from dull, repetitive tasks or physically chal-
lenging tasks, while providing standoff from dirty or dangerous missions. Such missions
include combat air patrol and ISR flights over contested airspace.
Consequently, the roles that UAVs perform in combat are increasingly critical to combat
commanders, from surveillance for the Army and ISR over hostile airspace, to precision
strikes on strategic targets. With this, the multiplier effect that UAVs bring to combat has
increased many folds, and UAVs are becoming a value piece of any military’s force struc-
ture. Increasingly, UAVs are becoming the preferred alternative, especially for operations
that are characterized as dull, dirty or dangerous [6]. UAVs were described by the Brigadier
General (BG) Riftin, Chief Artillery Officer of the Israeli Defence Force, speaking to the
broad use of UAVs during the 2014 Israeli combat operations in Gaza [7], as “phenomenal”
and “a real asset” that “boosted combat effectiveness of Operation Protective Edge.”
The increasing value that UAVs bring to the combat operations provides the impetus to
explore new and innovative ways in their employment. This study builds on the current and
project capabilities of UAVs to explore the new ways in which UAVs can be employed in
combat.
1.2 Kill Chains
A combat kill chain describes a systematic process to locate, target and engage an adversary
to create desired effects. It is an integrated, end-to-end process described as a “chain”
because any one deficiency will interrupt the entire process. First introduced by the Air
Force Chief of Staff, General (Gen.) Fogleman, in 1996 [8], the United States Air Force
(USAF) kill chain has evolved from Gen. Fogleman’s “find, fix, track and engage” into a
more encompassing kill chain to include the processes of “find, fix, track, target, engage
and assess.” Gen. Fogleman had used it to frame the future capabilities of the Air Force
[8]. In the past decade the kill chain processes of “find, fix, track, target, engage and
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assess (F2T2EA)” had been expanded to include the intelligence generation processes to
form the “anticipate, find, fix, track, target, engage and assess (AF2T2EA)” kill chain.
Gen. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), in 2013, spoke on the use of a modified
version of the kill chain to prioritize capability re-captilization. In his speech, he stated that
kill chain analysis allows the shortening of the sensor-shooter loop in combat so that assets
can be used more effectively to persecute targets and achieve campaign objectives [9]. Kill
chain analysis have also been applied to countering cyber threats. At its most fundamental
concept, the kill chain can be used to describe any sequence of end-to-end events, such that
upon the completion of all events sequentially, the desired effects are achieved [9].
General McChrystal, in his essay based on his experiences and lessons from his assign-
ment as Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan (USFOR-A), said that the Army had to develop its own version of a kill chain,
“find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze (F3EA),” when faced with the emerging threats of an en-
emy that uses twenty-first century technology. He gave the example of the Al Qaeda in Iraq
evolving into a resilient and flexible enemy, and the urgent need for the Army to develop a
new way to counter this emergent threat. [10]
Lieutenant General Michael of the United States Marine Corp (USMC) spoke to the USMC
kill chain in his annual program review brief [11]. He identified the five processes of
the USMC precision strike kill chain as “find, fix, target, track, engage” (F2T2E). In his
brief [11], he identified command and control as the key enabler to improving the precision
strike kill chain. He explained that the trend towards the use of UAVs operating within the
kill chain demonstrates the critical need for a robust command and control network.
Despite the reference to kill chains in all services, kill chain analysis amongst the services
had focused on examining the BLUEFORCE targeting and engagement kill chain to deter-
mine areas of improvement or capability development to the chain. Opportunities exist to
analyze the expanded kill chain. An expanded kill chain looks beyond the activities of the
kill chain and includes the per-requisite activities that lead up to the kill chain execution
as well as the activities that occur after the execution of the kill chain. For example, the
expanded kill chain of a F/A-18 strike operation will include the activities of mission plan-
ning and aircraft generation onboard the aircraft carrier. Insights gained from this may be
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used to identify possible areas of improvements that are not illuminated by past kill chain
analysis.
1.3 Kill Chain Analysis
Cheater [12], in his master’s thesis, used kill chain analysis to demonstrate that the use
of technologies will reduce the cycle time of the kill chain for unmanned aircraft. He
highlighted the need to focus not just on the end effects of the kill chain, but also on the
technologies that enable autonomy and interoperability in the war effort. Ultimately, by
applying the correct technologies to the critical tasks of gathering, analyzing and distribut-
ing intelligence, an anticipatory versus a reactionary behavior towards enemy action can be
achieved. Cheater had illuminated an important aspect of kill chain analysis – that while
the actual actions of find, fix, track, target, engage and access are important in a kill chain,
of equal importance are the prior actions that must be taken. He also cautioned that while
the intent for the use of technology to accelerate the kill chain was good, the efforts could
be jeopardized by political and cultural conflicts.
Bloye developed a heuristic kill chain analysis tool (KCAT) using Microsoft Excel that en-
ables the rapid identification of capability gaps and the generation of feasible schedules that
minimizes the kill chain cycle time. His study was able to demonstrate that KCAT could
provide the planners and decision makers with a quantitative assessment of the value of a
network-centric warfare in a time-sensitive targeting scenario. The analysis of kill chains
also enabled the experimentation and assessment of future concepts and capabilities [13].
Smith [14] demonstrated that kill chain analysis can be used to analyze a ship’s vulnerabil-
ities to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). In his analysis of the kill chain framework, two
approaches were used. The first approach analyzed the kill chain from a time-sequence per-
spective and examined the effectiveness of the ASCM for a hard kill and soft kill against
the ships. The second approach used a decision tree approach to model a single ASCM
against a ship’s air defense system. From these approaches, Smith was able to derive the
probabilities of success and failures of the missile engagements.
Wallace [15] presented a methodology for mission thread analysis, or kill chain analysis,
and its application to a specific weapon target pair. He explained the importance of as-
sessing the entire integrated systems that will provide military commanders with realistic
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assessments of the system’s effectiveness in the kill chain. Wallace described a mission
engineering approach to kill chain analysis that assesses the system’s technical capability
using a specific weapon target pair in the context of a kill chain. He posited that such an
approach would illuminate where capability gaps might lie as it offers the ability to assess
the capability portfolio of the fleet for each mission, and the ability to drill down to each
specific platform or platform class. This approach was then implemented in the warfare
capability baseline study.
Given the many studies in kill chain analysis with the aim of reducing the cycle time of
kill chains, it is timely that an examination of the cycle time for the expanded kill chain be
conducted. To this end, insights gained from the study into expanded kill chains may be
useful in helping future military planners understand the dependency of all activities and
processes of a future strike operation.
1.4 The Distributed Air Wing Concept
The “Distributed Air Wing” capstone study identified a carrier/land based unmanned air-to-
air fighting vehicle missile-truck concept (MTX) as a potential alternative to the realization
of a distributed air wing [16]. The MTX would increase the range, payload and deception
capabilities for operations in anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environments and contested
airspace. The capstone study identified defensive counter air (DCA), offensive counter
air (OCA) and early warning as capability areas where the MTX could close the capability
gap.
The MTX concept [16] described a system of unmanned aircraft, capable of carrying air-
to-air missiles. These unmanned aircraft accompany manned aircraft on fighter missions
and provide persistent on-station time for offensive and defensive counter-air missions.
For OCA and ISR missions, the MTX “missile-truck UAV” can be paired with a manned
fighter, or controlled by an operator from the ground. The study concluded that the MTX
would deliver the benefits of reducing personnel risks, increasing payload and the ability to
service an increased number of targets.
Three options for the unmanned aircraft in the MTX concept were proposed by the capstone
study [16]. The first involved the use of unmanned versions of existing manned fighters
such as the F/A-18 Super Hornet or F-16 Falcon. An upgraded version of an existing
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unmanned system such as the MQ-9 Reaper provided the second option. The third option
would deliver a dedicated unmanned combat aerial system such as the developmental X-47
unmanned carrier-launch airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS).
In a separate study, Gill [17] studied an air-to-ground strike sceanrio utilizing a pairing
between manned and unmanned assets. The study compared the use of F/A-18 Super Hor-
nets and F-35C Lightning II as the manned aircraft and found that stealth technology was
a critical factor for high BLUEFORCE survivability rates. The study also concluded that a
package size of four was advantageous in terms of achieving high target destruction rates.
This study takes the MTX concept and extends it to a strategic surface strike operation.
Both the capstone [16] and Gill’s [17] findings provide the basis for initial force structure
sizing of a manned-unmanned strike package. For this study, a package consisting of four
manned stealth fighters and eight unmanned aircraft will be used.
1.5 Swarms
In nature, swarms exhibit a level of intelligence and coordination significantly higher than
that of an individual member of the swarm community. There had been great interest
in the collaborative capabilities of such swarming communities in nature. Gordon and
Greene [18] and Gordon et al. [19] found that communications between individual ants of
various roles was critical to the successful swarming behavior of the colony. For example,
Gordon found that an ant colony, working as a swarm community, was capable of over-
coming obstacles and solving problems that was unthinkable for an individual ant. Similar
swarming behaviors are observable in schools of sardines as well as in hives of bees [19].
In the realm of UAVs, Gaertner [20] defined a swarm as a network of UAVs, each UAV
possessing the capability to communicate with the other UAVs within the network. Gaert-
ner noted that the level of autonomy in the swarm was such that the network of UAVs could
work together and self-organize in order to accomplish a common mission objective [20].
This network of UAVs could then be described as a swarm network. Gaertner [20] inves-
tigated swarm-versus-swarm in UAV combat tactics and identified the key factors of such
engagements. His work provided tactical insights into the development of swarm tactics
for future air combat scenarios involving unmanned aircraft.
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A report published by the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for a 2009 study of
time critical conventional strike from a strategic standoff highlighted the possibility of us-
ing swarm concepts as a low cost autonomous attack system against time critical targets.
In such a system, the writers envisaged a swarm of weaponized miniature aerial vehicles
equipped with a lasing and targeting capability that could be employed against moving or
relocatable targets and are capable of multi-missile swarming tactics [21].
Muraru [22] posited the concept that UAVs operating as an autonomous system in swarm-
ing concepts can lead to improved survivability of the systems. He identified swarming as a
possible area where smart coordination and cooperative technologies could be implemented
through intelligent control.
The capability for unmanned aircraft to exhibit swarming behaviors can potentially enable
the realization of disruptive capabilities in future strike operations. This study will utilize
the insights from past studies in the exploration and formulation of potential capabilities
that can be realized by the teaming of manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft with swarm
capabilities.
1.6 Research Questions
The pairing of dedicated unmanned combat aerial systems with a manned fighter as a con-
trol platform presents a potential area where technologies of a swarming network of UAV
can be capitalized. To this end, following are the key research questions:.
1. What are the capabilities that arise from the pairing of manned and unmanned air-
craft, and specifically unmanned aircraft with swarm capabilities?
2. What is the expanded kill chain of a manned-unmanned teaming strike mission?
3. What are the potential limiting factors that preclude the employment of such a con-
cept?
1.7 Approach and Methodology
A systems engineering approach is used to identify the capability areas where such team-
ing of manned and unmanned systems can be employed. Amongst the identified capability
area, the design reference mission (DRM) for each capability’s expanded kill chain is devel-
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oped and analyzed to assess the effect that an employment of UAV system with swarming
capabilities, inJoin place of manned platforms, has on the kill chain effectiveness. The
main area of interest of this study is to illuminate the elements of the expanded kill chain
that past kill chain analyses may not have considered. The study will make certain assump-
tions about the behavior and performance of the future manned and unmanned aircraft, and
this thesis will document these assumptions.
1.8 Organization of Thesis
In Chapter 2, the systems engineering approach taken is first described. It is then applied to
identify the possible capability gaps in current strike operations. The study then identifies
the potential capabilities, based on capabilities from the Department of Defense (DOD)
joint capability areas (JCA) framework that a system of swarm UAVs can realize. A map-
ping of the potential capabilities to the top-level JCA capabilities are shown.
Thereafter, Chapter 3 details the DRM that is developed based on the selected capability.
The operational activities of the DRM are built and illustrated using Vitech CORE 9. A
functional analysis of the DRM is performed based on the operational activities to identify
the key functions and their enhanced functional flow block diagrams (EFFBDs) required to
implement the operational activities. These EFFBDs are built and illustrated using Vitech
CORE 9.
Chapter 4 describes the design of experiments and the simulation models that are developed
to facilitate the analysis of the kill chain of the selected capability. As the kill chain is
similar to a process flow, ExtendSim 9.0 is used to build the model. Activity blocks are
used to model the processes within the expanded kill chain.
Chapter 5 proposes three possible alternative concept of operations (CONOPS) for the
MTX and presents the analysis of these alternatives. Chapter 6 discusses the observations
and insights, and provides concluding remarks and details the possible future work.
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CHAPTER 2:
Approach and Capability Mapping
This chapter describes the research approach and system engineering tools used for this
study. This is followed by a hierarchical decomposition to the second tier reflecting the
capability areas in DOD’s JCA Framework [23]. This chapter explores the potential capa-
bilities that manned-unmanned teaming can deliver. Specifically, the identified unmanned-
unmanned teaming capabilities are mapped to the Tier-1 capabilities of the JCA Framework
to ensure that the identified capabilities are relevant to the current capability requirements.
2.1 Approach
Figure 2.1 shows an overview of the system analysis approach used in this study.
Figure 2.1: A nine-step process is used in this study to investigate the expanded kill chain of
manned-unmanned teaming for future strike operations. System engineering tools are used where
appropriate to facilitate the analysis.
In the figure, the processes or activities are depicted as boxes , and the documents
generated from the process or activities are depicted as . When external data or infor-
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mation is used, these are depicted using . The details of each step in the approach is
described in the following paragraphs.
Step 1: Capability Identification and Mapping
The first step involves the identification of capabilities that could be realized by manned-
unmanned teaming. For this, the JCA Framework is referenced and all capabilities identi-
fied are mapped back to the Tier-1 capability areas in the framework. Refer to Section 2.2
for details of the potential manned-unmanned capabilities identified.
Step 2: Develop Design Reference Mission
From the capabilities identified from Step 1, a specific capability is selected for further
analysis. To this end, a DRM is developed. The DRM contains a description of the scenario,
an assessment of the threats, and a definition of the mission. Refer to Chapter 3, Section
3.2 and 3.4 for details of the scenario and mission definition respectively.
Step 3: Operational Activity Analysis
The high-level operational activities for the DRM are then derived and illustrated using
in Vitech CORE. This involves the development of the basic kill chain and the expanded
kill chain for the scenario and mission. Each top-level operational activity is further de-
composed to the next level. The heuristics in CORE facilitates the subsequent process of
functional analysis and mapping. Refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.6 for details on the opera-
tional activity analysis.
Step 4: Functional Analysis
Functional analysis is performed in this step. From the operational activities identified, sys-
tem functions are defined to enable the identification of the key functional requirements of
the system or system of systems (SoS). The results of the analysis is a functional hierarchy
decomposition of the manned-unmanned teaming capability of interest. Refer to Chapter
3, Section 3.7 for details of the functional analysis.
Step 5: Functional Mapping
To facilitate a better understanding of the relationships between the components of the
SoS, a mapping of the functions to the operational activities and the components is per-
formed. For each operational activity, functions necessary for its implementation are
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mapped. Each function is then allocated to one component in the function-to-component
mapping. Heuristics in CORE ensures that each function is allocated to only one compo-
nent. Refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.8 and 3.9 for details of the mapping of functions to
operational activities and components respectively.
Step 6: Design of Experiments
Design of experiments is performed. To this end, design factors, measures of effectiveness
and performance are defined in this step. The design of experiment is accomplished using
JMP Pro 10, a statistical analysis program. Chapter 4 describes the details of this step.
Step 7: Develop Simulation Models
The basic kill chain and the expanded kill chain is modeled in ExtendSim. Simulation runs
of the model enable the determination of the cycle time for the kill chain and the expanded
kill chain. The cycle time of specific processes within the expanded kill chain are also
determined through the simulation. Refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.5 and 4.6 for details of
the kill chain and expanded kill chain simulation models respectively.
Step 8: Results Analysis
Results from the simulation are analyzed to determine the main effects from the design
factors. Effect analysis is accomplished using the statistical analysis program, JMP Pro
10. The identification of factors that has the largest effects enable the development of
refinements in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the manned-unmanned team-
ing operation. Limiting factors of the manned-unmanned teaming operation are identified.
Refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.7 for details of the analysis.
Step 9: Analysis of Alternatives
Three alternatives are proposed in this step. The proposed alternatives serve to address or
mitigate the identified limiting factors of the manned-unmanned teaming operation. Each
alternative is analyzed for its effectiveness in addressing or mitigating the identified limiting
factors. Modifications are made to the simulation models, where necessary, to enable the
study of the effectiveness of the alternatives. Where possible, future concepts of operations
are also proposed. Chapter 5 presents details of the analysis of alternatives.
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2.2 Joint Capability Areas
Capability needs are articulated as a JCA document and form the JCA Framework [23].
The JCA Framework is a collection of capabilities functionally grouped to support ca-
pability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio
management and capabilities-based force development and operational planning [23]. The
JCA is divided into nine Tier-1 functional areas. The terminology (shown in italics) for
the respective capability areas are quoted directly from the JCA Framework to preserve the
formal definitions of the capability areas.
2.2.1 Force Support
This area focuses on the ability to establish, develop, maintain and manage a mission ready
Total Force. This area is decomposed into the sub-areas of Force Management, Force
Preparation, Human Capital Management and Health Readiness.
2.2.2 Battlespace Awareness
This area focuses on the ability to understand dispositions and intentions as well as the
characteristics and conditions of the operational environment that bear on national and
military decision-making by leveraging all sources of information to include Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Meteorological, and Oceanographic. This area is decom-
posed into the sub-areas of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Environ-
ment.
2.2.3 Force Application
This area focuses on the ability to integrate the use of maneuver and engagement in all
environments to create the effects necessary to achieve mission objectives. This area is
further decomposed into the two areas of maneuver and wngagement.
2.2.4 Logistics
This area focuses on the ability to project and sustain a logistically ready joint force through
the deliberate sharing of national and multi-national resources to effectively support op-
erations, extend operational reach and provide the joint force commander the freedom of
action necessary to meet mission objectives. This area is decomposed into sub-areas of
12
deployment and distribution, supply, maintain, logistics services, operational contract sup-
port, engineering and installations support.
2.2.5 Command and Control
This area focuses on the ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly desig-
nated commander or decision maker over assigned and attached forces and resources in
the accomplishment of the mission. It is decomposed into the sub-areas of organization,
understanding, planning, deciding, directing and monitoring.
2.2.6 Net-Centric
This area focuses on the ability to provide a framework for full human and technical con-
nectivity and interoperability that allows all DOD users and mission partners to share the
information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand and act on with
confidence, and protects information from those who should not have it. It is decomposed
into the sub-areas of Information transport, enterprise services, net management and infor-
mation assurance.
2.2.7 Protection
This area focuses on the ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects of attacks on personnel
(combatant/non-combatant) and physical assets of the United States, allies and friends. It
is decomposed into the sub-areas of prevention, mitigation, and research and development.
2.2.8 Building Partnerships
This area focuses on the ability to interact with partner, competitor or adversary leaders,
security institutions, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and
conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities in order
to build effective, legitimate, interoperable, and self-sustaining strategic partners. This
includes the sub-areas of communication and policy shaping.
2.2.9 Corporate Management and Support
This area focuses on the ability to provide strategic senior level, enterprise-wide leadership,
direction, coordination, and oversight through a chief management officer function. It
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includes the sub-areas of advisory and compliance, strategy and assessment, information
management, acquisition, and program, budget and finance.
2.3 Potential Manned-Unmanned Capabilities
The unique system characteristics of an aerial manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T)
present opportunities for the realization of capabilities that have been traditionally under-
taken by manned aircraft. Manned aircraft’s performance and endurance are limited by
the physical traits and capabilities of the operator. Integration of manned platforms with
autonomous UAV systems enables the reduction of workload off the operator, thereby en-
hancing the operator’s efficacy during operations.
The potential capabilities from teaming manned platforms with unmanned systems are
identified through extrapolation of current technologies in UAV systems, sensor systems
and weapon systems. The key advantages of employing UAV systems are in the areas of
resource efficacy, autonomy and mitigation of risk to human lives. These potential capabili-
ties that can be performed by manned and unmanned teams are described in the subsequent
paragraphs.
2.3.1 Manned-Unmanned Teaming
The teaming of manned and unmanned aircraft could possibly be a disruptive technology
in future combat. The MUM-T concept calls for the establishment of a command data
link between a manned aircraft and one or more unmanned aircraft, operating as a single
unit towards the achievement of a specific mission objective. The concept was employed
in the late 1960s when the USAF modified sixteen C-130s (designated DC-130) to deploy
AQM-34 Firebee drones. Airborne DC-130s controlled these drones for reconnaissance
and electronic warfare operations. Each DC-130s had the ability to deploy and control
up to four drones simultaneously [24]. In 2006, Lockheed Martin successfully demon-
strated the MUM-T (strike) concept using an AH-64D Longbow Apache helicopter, a UH-
60 Black Hawk helicopter and an RQ-5B Hunter UAV [6]. Nonetheless, there have been
limited operational applications of MUM-T. Even in such operations where MUM-T was
employed, the UAVs primarily performed the ISR role for the purpose of reconnaissance,
target location and designation. In 2014, the U.S. Navy pushed the manned and unmanned
teaming concept closer to reality when they successfully demonstrated the safe and seam-
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less operations of the launch and recovery of manned and unmanned aircraft off an aircraft
carrier [25]. In that test, the USN demonstrated the capability to launch of an F/A-18 Su-
per Hornet from catapult 2 followed by a X-47B UCLASS from catapult 1 within a time
period of 90 seconds. In the same test, the USN was also able to land the X-47B and the
F-18 Hornet within 90 seconds of each other. This demonstration paved the way for future
tests of unmanned aircraft from aircraft carrier in an operationally realistic environment.
Figure 2.2 shows a screen grab from a U.S. Navy video of the test [26] posted on the U.S.
Navy’s official YouTube Channel.
Figure 2.2: An F/A-18 Super Hornet and a X-47B UCLASS lines up on the catapults aboard the
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) just prior to launch. The tests demonstrated the integration
of manned and unmanned aircraft onboard an aircraft carrier and the ability for unmanned aircraft
to operate safely and seamlessly with manned aircraft. (from [26])
2.3.2 Potential Application of Manned-Unmanned Teaming
The following paragraphs explore the possibilities where the application of manned-
unmanned teaming, including unmanned systems with swarming capabilities, provides for
enhanced operational efficacy.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
UAVs have been traditionally employed in the role of intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance. The military can effectively employ a UAV system with swarming capabilities,
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enabling an organic coordinating capability to maximize the ISR coverage while avoiding
detection and threats. Teamed with a manned fighter package, the swarm UAV system can
perform the role of forward scouts during operations, relaying real-time imagery to enhance
the strike package’s battle-space situational awareness.
Maritime Surveillance
Similar to ISR, a swarm UAV system teamed with a maritime surveillance aircraft perform-
ing the role of an airborne control can effectively provide a maritime surveillance (MS)
capability in, for example, counter-piracy and maintenance of open sea lanes of commu-
nication over a larger area. A swarm UAV system teamed with a maritime surveillance
aircraft will be capable of providing wider coverage and a longer persistence compared
to multiple maritime surveillance aircraft, which may be susceptible to crew fatigue and
resource limitations.
Search and Rescue
A swarming UAV system can provide a multiplier effect to a search and rescue (SAR) mis-
sion through its organic coordinating capability to achieve more efficient search patterns to
achieve efficacy in the search and location of casualties. The use of unmanned swarm sys-
tems for SAR removes the need for the SAR team to operate in a hostile area unnecessarily.
Nonetheless, a manned aircraft will likely still need to be deployed into the hostile area for
recovery once the casualty has been located by the swarm system.
Defensive Counter Air and Offensive Counter Air
A system of UAVs teamed with manned aircraft could realize a multiplier effect to both
DCA and OCA operations through the saturation of enemy air units, in either a defensive
or offensive posture. This could potentially require less resources while providing a more
comprehensive coverage. However, a major consideration of such an employment will be
in the aspect of weapon release authority, which will still require a man-in-the-loop.
Manned-Unmanned Teaming (Strike)
The teaming of manned and unmanned aircraft in precision strike missions could provide
enhancements in range and payload. For example, UAVs can be employed as missile trucks
to increase the payload of manned fighters, or as forward ISR aircraft for target location
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and designation. The use of UAVs for strike also minimizes the risk of loss of human lives
as it removes the pilot from direct line of fire.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
A system of UAVs can be employed in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)
missions to enhance the supply chain’s efficiency. Smaller and cheaper than helicopters,
a flight of light to medium-lift unmanned aircraft, teamed with a single airborne control
platform, may be able to provide the necessary lifting capacity to disaster areas that are
inaccessible by road or conventional transport aircraft.
Rapidly Deployable Network
A swarming UAV system consisting of UAVs with communications relay capabilities can
provide an effective communications network in areas with none or degraded communica-
tions infrastructure. The swarm UAV system can provide, for example, an aerial cellphone
network round-the-clock through synchronized holding maneuvers over the desired area of
operations.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense and Destruction of Enemy Air Defense
Autonomous UAVs can be employed as a forward package to provide suppression of en-
emy air defense (SEAD) and destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD) capabilities for
a following strike package consisting of manned fighters. UAVs can be equipped with a
targeting system or configured to carry high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) for use
against enemy air defense systems. Such a package of UAV system could be employed to
destroy enemy air defense radar systems and cause the enemy air defense to “go blind,”
enabling the safe ingress of the strike package.
Electronic Warfare
UAVs can be employed in selected electronic warfare (EW) missions to provide electronic
attack (EA), ELINT and radar warning receiver (RWR) capabilities. An swarming UAV
system can provide a more effective and coordinated EW capability at lower risk. When
teamed with manned aircraft, such UAV systems can provide coordinated off-axis EW
capabilities.
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Stand-Off Jammer and Support Jammer
When teamed with manned aircraft, a UAV system could provide a highly effective stand-
off jammer (SOJ) or support jammer (SPJ) capability to a strike package, either through
forward deployment or off-axis jamming.
2.4 Mapping to Joint Capability Areas Framework
Figure 2.4 shows the mapping of potential swarm capabilities to the JCA Framework. The
potential manned-unmanned teaming capabilities (shaded in grey diagonal lines) described
above are mapped to five of the nine Tier-1 capabilities in the JCA Framework. Tier-1
capabilities that are not mapped to potential manned-unmanned teaming capabilities are
omitted for brevity.
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Figure 2.3: Mapping of potential manned-unmanned teaming capabilities to the JCA framework.
This study will focus on the capability area of “force application.” Specifically, the study
looks into the sub-area of “engagement” as realized by manned-unmanned teaming towards
the accomplishment of a MUM-T (strike) operation.
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Among the potential capabilities identified for manned-unmanned teaming in the preceding
chapter, the manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) (strike) capability is perhaps the most
complex, requiring close coordination and positive control of the unmanned aircraft [6].
The use of manned and unmanned teaming for strike has also never been performed. There-
fore, this research used the MUM-T (strike) capability for this study. As part of the study,
a DRM is developed for this capability. The DRM describes the projected operational
environment of the mission, the mission success requirements, a definition of the mis-
sion capabilities and operational activities, and a description of the mission execution [27].
The projected operational environment includes both typical operational and environmental
conditions, and also includes a brief threat assessment specific to the mission. The mission
execution description elaborates on the expanded kill chain for the mission and highlights
selected operational situations.
3.1 Actors
For the purpose of DRM development, the following fictitious actors, BLUELAND and
REDLAND, are assumed. In addition, DOD’s definition of a manned-unmanned teaming
is adopted. It states that manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) refers to the relationships
established between manned and unmanned systems personnel prosecuting a common mis-
sion as an integrated team. More specifically, manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) is the
overarching term used to describe platform interoperability and shared asset control to
achieve a common operational mission objective [6].
3.1.1 BLUELAND
The BLUELAND has a fleet of advanced UAVs that has been used to conduct strikes
against transnational terrorist threat (T3) targets. BLUELAND has, in recent years, in-
vested heavily in the research and development of swarm technology for the UAVs. These
investments have paid off, delivering BLUELAND with the capability to conduct selected
combat missions employing swarm tactics. Under BLUELAND’s distributed air wing con-
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cept [16], BLUELAND fighters and UCAVs are embarked on their respective naval surface
vessels. The UCAVs are operated from a larger version of the next-generation escort car-
rier (CVEX) [28], the evolution of next-generation escort carrier (CVEX 2), that is capable
of launching and recovering large UCAVs while the fighters operate from aircraft carriers.
BLUELAND Manned Fighters
The BLUELAND manned fighters in the 202X time frame are fifth-generation fighters,
with a combat effectiveness on parity with the F-35C Lightning II. The fighters are ad-
vanced multi-role all weather, day and night, very low observable (VLO) fighters. The
weapons are carried in internal weapons bay and the air-to-ground (AG) weapons load
out consists of two joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) or eight small diameter bombs
(SDBs). In addition to the Link16 data link, the BLUELAND fighter is equipped with a
low probability of intercept (LPI) data link that provides intra-ship (fighter-to-fighter) com-
munications and UCAV command link capability. The BLUELAND fighter has a combat
range of up to 700 nautical miles (nm). The BLUELAND manned fighters can be launched
from aircraft carriers and land bases.
BLUELAND Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
The BLUELAND UCAVs in the 202X time frame is a supersonic VLO aircraft with LPI
data links and an internal weapons carriage bay. Similar to the BLUELAND fighters, the
AG weapons load out of the UCAV is two JDAMs or eight SDBs. The UCAV has a combat
range of 2000nm. This enables it to execute strategic strikes deep into A2AD environments
or highly contested airspace. The BLUELAND UCAV can be launched from CVEX 2 and
land bases.
3.1.2 REDLAND
The REDLAND is a rogue nation that has consistently adopted an aggressive approach
to intrusions into its territorial waters. REDLAND has an air force that is a near-peer to
BLUELAND’s Air Force and has also recently operationalized an aircraft carrier. RED-
LAND is involved in a sovereignty dispute with several neighboring nations over a group
of isles in an area of international waters outside of REDLAND’s exclusive economic
zone (EEZ). Several skirmishes have already occurred between REDLAND’s Air Force
and the Air Forces of the neighboring nations.
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3.2 Scenario
The scenario is set in the year 202X. REDLAND has been exhibiting increasing aggressive
A2AD actions in the littoral waters and waters surrounding a group of disputed islands in
international waters. Recently, REDLAND had unilaterally declared an air defense identi-
fication zone (ADIZ) over a portion of the international waters that includes the disputed
isles. BLUELAND has declared openly that it does not recognize REDLAND’s ADIZ and
has executed several flight operations in the area to challenge the legitimacy of the ADIZ.
BLUELAND intends to heighten its military presence in the area to maintain continued
open sea lines of communications (SLOC). BLUELAND operates a number of air bases in
the surrounding nations and plans to use these bases as staging bases for its naval air assets.
At present, the BLUELAND has deployed an aircraft carrier and a CVEX 2 into the area
and there are plans to deploy another aircraft carrier and two more CVEX 2s into the area.
A recent skirmish between REDLAND and BLUELAND units in the waters off the dis-
puted isles resulted in the sinking of a BLUELAND surface vessel. The news of the sinking
is widely reported in global media. This results in an increasing anxiety amongst the sur-
rounding nations to a potential escalation of military conflict in the region. Although the
sinking did not result in a loss of life for the BLUE LAND Navy, there is an urgent need
for BLUELAND to demonstrate its military might in order to deter further aggressions and
restore stability to the region. However, BLUELAND is cautious that any military action
must be de-escalatory in nature, and an open strike on REDLAND is not tenable. To this
end, a covert strategic strike on REDLAND airbases to effectively disable or degrade RED-
LAND’s DCA and OCA capabilities is planned. The strike is to be performed by a team
of manned and unmanned aircraft operating as a integrated strike package and will deliver
weapons onto REDLAND’s airbases.
3.3 Threat Assessment
Threats are categorized as kinetic, cyber and natural. Kinetic threats consist of mainly pro-
jectile and ammunition fired from hand-held or ground-based air defense systems. Elec-
tronic threats consist of systems utilizing electromagnetic means to degrade and interfere
with the operations of the radar system, or achieve deception. This is achieved through
the use of either noise for degradation and interference, or false information for deception.
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Cyber threats consist of the enemy gaining access to any secured communications or data
links. Natural threats consist of weather and terrain. The threats to a manned-unmanned
strike operation are described in the following paragraphs.
3.3.1 Kinetic Threats
The MUM-T (strike) package operates at a high altitude, out of range of most small-arms
fire and anti-aircraft fire. These systems are unable to effectively engage aircraft flying at
altitudes above 30,000 feet. However, threats from advance surface-to-air missiles exist.
REDLAND airbases are protected by S-400 class air defense systems. The S-400 class air
defense systems has an effective range of between 120km (60nm) to 400km (222nm) up
to altitudes of up to 100,000 feet and is integrated with a radar capable of detecting low-
signature targets [29].The ability to penetrate deep into the ADIZ is critical to the successful
delivery of weapons against the ground targets. Thus, the ability to avoid detection through
the employment of VLO aircraft is critical to mission success.
3.3.2 Cyber Threats
Any MUM-T mission requires close coordination and control, so there is a heavy reliance
on data link integrity and availability. The data link is critical for mission success. A loss
of data link results in a total loss of communications and consequently loss of control over
the unmanned aircraft. The employment of LPI data and communications links reduces the
risks of compromise of the data and communications links.
3.3.3 Natural Threats
Adverse weather conditions over the targets could mean that a positive location and iden-
tification of targets is not possible. As such, it is important that accurate and timely in-
formation about the weather over the target area be available to mission planners and the
combat commanders. In addition to weather, ground clutter due to terrain or environmental
features can also result in the system’s inability to accurately resolve a target solution for
engagement.
3.4 Mission Definition
Based on intelligence update and analysis, a strategic strike on REDLAND’s airbases to in-
flict sufficient damage to degrade or disable the REDLAND’s DCA and OCA capabilities
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would provide a sufficiently strong deterrent signal and compel REDLAND to tone down
their aggressive posture. As the REDLAND airbases are located deep within the RED-
LAND ADIZ and defended by heavy air defense, BLUELAND headquarters (HQ) orders
a MUM-T (strike) mission. The mission objective is to execute a pre-emptive strategic
strike against REDLAND’s aircraft and airbase infrastructure. The objective of the strike is
to inflict sufficient destruction to the airbase infrastructure and aircraft on ground to cripple
REDLAND’s air force in the near-term.
The mission order is disseminated to the CVEX 2 and the carrier strike group (CSG). Upon
receipt of the mission orders, both CVEX 2 and the CSG commence joint mission planning
and prepare the UAVs and aircraft for launch. All UAVs allocated for the mission are
equipped with an integrated targeting suite. A total of four manned fighters and eight
UCAVs are allocated for this mission. Table 3.1 shows the force structure for the order of
battle for the BLUELAND MUM-T (strike) package.









Figure 3.1 shows the high-level operational view for the MUM-T (strike) DRM.
Figure 3.1: MUM-T (strike) DRM high-level operational view, OV-1. The major phases of the
operations are “Launch and formation of MUM-T (strike) package,” “Ingress towards target,”
“Target engagement” and “Egress and recovery.”
The activities depicted in the operational view is described in the following paragraphs with
phases indicated by numerals in the yellow circles.
1. Phase 1 – Launch and formation of MUM-T (strike) package: After launch, the
manned fighters and the UCAVs transit to a per-determined rendezvous point. The
rendezvous point is located outside the REDLAND ADIZ. At the rendezvous point,
an airborne link-up between the manned fighters and the UCAVs is accomplished
and control of the UCAVs is handed over from the ground control station onboard
the CVEX 2 to the manned fighters.
2. Phase 2 – Ingress towards target: After the successful airborne link-up of all four
manned fighters with the eight UCAVs, the MUM-T (strike) package commences
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the covert ingress towards the target. The UAVs are vectored by the manned fighters
towards the target deep within the ADIZ. During ingress, the UAVs autonomously
locate and identify the targets, and generate the target solution. This is accomplished
through information sharing and collaborative sense-making between the UCAVs.
The UCAVs also perform autonomous threat avoidance using their onboard sensors.
Video feed is piped back to the manned fighters throughout the ingress targeting
phase.
3. Phase 3 – Target engagement: The UCAVs, being able to penetrate deeper into the
ADIZ, are used for target location, identification and designation. Target identifica-
tion and confirmation is performed by the manned fighter via real-time video feed
from the UCAVs. When the UCAVs are within range of the target, and targets hav-
ing been positively identified, weapon release commands are given by the manned
fighters. The ISR UAVs will provide video feed for the manned fighter to perform
battle assessment and confirm the destruction of the targets.
4. Phase 4 – Egress and recovery: The entire MUM-T package then egresses and
returns to their respective bases. Control of the UAVs is handed over to the UAV
ground control on the CVEX 2 for UAV recovery. Intelligence debrief is conducted
as part of mission debrief.
3.6 Operational Activities Analysis
The MUM-T (strike) mission as defined in Section 3.2 is used to develop the operational
activities necessary for the basis of the capability. The operational activities schematics
(Operational View - 5b) are built and illustrated using Vitech CORE 9 [30]. Figure 3.2
shows the operational activities of the MUM-T (strike) mission. The “USMC.KC” block
represents the USMC kill chain while the preceding and following blocks represent the
expanded kill chain.
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Figure 3.2: MUM-T (strike) operational activities (OV-5b) showing the expanded kill chain to
include the pre-requisite operational activities leading up to the traditional kill chain activity of
“F2T2E” and the activities after the completion of the traditional kill chain. The traditional kill
chain is depicted as a single activity block named “F2T2E.”
Each block in the operational activity flow is described in the following paragraphs starting
from the left and proceeding to the right. The green box represents the trigger for the
start of the specific operational activity that the arrow points to. Grey boxes represents
the output and input to the respective operational activities, with arrow point out of the
operational activity indicating “output” and arrow pointing into the operational activity
indicating “input.”
1. Threat Assessment (TA) – Upon receipt of the mission orders, a threat assessment
is performed for the area of operations. Threat intelligence may come from diverse
sources. These sources may include open source intelligence (OSINT), human in-
telligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), measurement and signa-
ture intelligence (MASINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), cyber and digital network
intelligence (CYBINT/DNINT). Threat assessment will also include inputs for DE-
FCON and THREATCON statuses. The output from the threat assessment is the
intelligence update. Figure 3.3 shows the decomposition of the operational activities
for threat assessment.
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Figure 3.3: Decomposition of threat assessment (TA) operational activity. The decomposition
identifies the various intelligence sources, alert postures and threat conditions as inputs and
the intelligence update as the output of the operational activity. Four second-level operational
activities are identified.
2. Mission Planning (MSNPLAN) – This block represents the activities of mission
planning. Mission planning is conducted jointly between the mission-planning teams
onboard the aircraft carrier and CVEX 2. The output of this function is the Mission
Plan. Figure 3.4 shows the decomposition of the operational activities for mission
planning.
Figure 3.4: Decomposition of mission planning (MSNPLAN) operational activity. The decompo-
sition identifies the necessary second-level activities that must run in parallel, the inputs required
and the mission plan as the output from this operational activity. Nine second-level operational
activities are identified.
3. Launch Manned Fighter (MUM.T.STRIKE.1) – This block represents the launch-
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ing of the manned fighters for the mission. This involves the preparation (pre-flight,
weapons loading and end-of-runway (EOR) checks) of the fighters for flight and
combat.
4. Transit to RV Point (MUM.T.STRIKE.2) – This block represents the transition
of all air assets after their launch to the designated RV Point. The time taken is
dependent on the aircraft’s speed, the distance from the launch site to the RV Point
and the weather conditions.
5. Airborne Link-up (MUM.T.STRIKE.3) – This block represents the handing over
of control of the UCAVs to the manned fighters. Once the manned fighters have
authenticated and established a secured command data link with the UCAVs, the
ground control stations will hand over controls of the UCAVs to the manned fighters.
Each manned fighter will assume control over two UCAVs and this force structure
forms one MUM-T (strike) unit. Figure 3.5 shows the decomposition of operational
activities for airborne link-up.
Figure 3.5: Decomposition of airborne link-up (MUM.T.STRIKE.3) operational activity. The
decomposition identifies five second-level activities in order for the manned fighter and to establish
communications with and obtain positive control of the UCAV
6. Launch UCAV Package (UCAV.APG) – This block represents the launching of the
UCAV for the mission. This involves preparing (pre-flight, weapons loading and
EOR checks) the UCAV and the initializing of the ground control stations for the
launch. It is assumed that the UCAVs are equipped with auto take-off and land-
ing (ATOL) capabilities, thus no external pilots are required for the actual take-off
control after the EOR checks.
7. Covert Ingress (INGRESS) – Once the MUM-T (strike) package is formed, the
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package proceeds to ingress towards the area of operations. The package does so
covertly, avoiding detection as far as possible.
8. Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage (USMC.KC) – This block represents the tradi-
tional USMC kill chain. A detailed decomposition of this block is shown in Fig-
ure 3.6. The decomposition identifies target location (Find), designation (Fix), track-
ing (Track), targeting (Target) and engagement (Engage) as the second-level opera-
tional activities in the kill chain. The “WEAPONS” block identifies the quantity of
weapons as a resource limitation and limits the number of targets that can be engaged.
Figure 3.6: USMC kill chain operational activities. The decomposition identifies target location
(Find), designation (Fix), tracking (Track), targeting (Target) and engagement (Engage) as the
second-level operational activities in the kill chain.
9. Covert Egress (EGRESS) – Upon completion of the mission, the MUM-T (strike)
package covertly egresses the area of operations.
10. Return to Base (RECOVER) – Upon reaching the designated rendezvous point,
control of the UCAVs is relinquished by the manned fighters and handed back to the
ground control stations. Both manned and unmanned aircraft return to their respec-
tive bases, with the UCAVs performing automatic landing.
11. Intelligence Debrief (INTEL.DEBRIEF) – Upon return, an intelligence debrief is
conducted with the pilots of the mission while video footage from the UCAVs is
analyzed by the intelligence community.
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3.7 Functional Analysis
The next step of the process is to perform functional analysis for the system described in
the DRM. For this study, the system is defined as a MUM-T (strike) unit consisting of one
manned aircraft and two unmanned aircraft that are under the control of the manned aircraft.
The MUM-T (strike) package (a system of systems) refers to the integrated system of four
MUM-T (strike) units, consisting of four manned aircraft and the eight UCAVs under the
control of the manned aircraft. Functional analysis begins with the identification of the
Level-1 system functions. Seven Level-1 system functions are identified. All EFFBDs are
developed and illustrated using Vitech Core 9.
Figure 3.7 shows the decomposition of the seven system functions into their respective sub-
functions. These functions are decomposed into their respective Level-2 sub-functions.
These functions and sub-functions are described in the following subsections and para-
graphs.
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Figure 3.7: Functional hierarchy of MUM-T (strike) system. A total of seven Level-1 functions
are identified. Their respective sub-functions are detailed in this figure.
3.7.1 Execute Command and Control
Figure 3.8 shows the functional decomposition for the “Execute command and control
(C2)” function. This function is prevalent in all other functions. This function provides the
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manned aircraft with the capability to exercise positive control over the two UCAVs during
the operation. This function also provides the UCAVs with the necessary autonomous
capability when operating as a swarm with the other UCAV in the package. The sub-
functions of “Execute C2” are described in the following paragraphs.
Figure 3.8: Execute command and control (C2) EFFBD. This function is prevalent during all
phases of the operation.
Provide Battlespace Awareness – This function provides the manned fighter with the bat-
tlespace situation awareness necessary for decision making. This may be accomplished
through the provision of a real-time recognized air situation picture built from onboard or
off-board sensors, including target tracks, video imagery and threat information generated
by the UCAVs.
Exercise Positive Control – This function provides the manned fighter with the capability
to have positive control over the UCAVs. Positive controls will include commands to ma-
neuver, to execute targeting actions and to release weapons. On the UCAVs, this function
provides the UCAV with limited capability to exhibit autonomous behaviors such as obsta-
cle avoidance, active threat avoidance and targeting functions of location and designation.
Exercise Command – This function enables the manned fighter to perform the role of




Figure 3.9 shows the functional decomposition for the “Assess Threats” function. This
function provides the joint mission-planning team with the capability to perform threat
assessment during the joint mission-planning phase. This is accomplished through the
provision of threat database and intelligence support. The sub-functions of“Assess Threat”
are described in the following paragraphs.
Figure 3.9: Assess threats EFFBD.
Receive Intelligence – This function provides the joint mission-planning team with the ca-
pability to receive intelligence reports and updates from the various intelligence generating
nodes.
Process Intelligence – This function provides the joint mission-planning team with the ca-
pability to process the received intelligence for use towards threat assessment for the mis-
sion. The capability also enables the joint mission-planning team to generate the necessary
threat databases formatted for uploading onto the manned fighters and UCAVs.
Classify Intelligence – This function provides the joint mission-planning team with the
ability to classify processed intelligence according to its relevance to the mission.
Disseminate Intelligence – This function enables the processed and classified intelligence
to be packaged into a format suitable for the expeditious dissemination to all elements
within the strike package.
3.7.3 Form Team
Figure 3.10 shows the functional decomposition of the “Form Team” function. This func-
tion provides the capability for the establishment data links between the elements of the
strike package. This includes intra-manned aircraft and intra-UCAV data links as well as
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data links between the manned aircraft and the UCAVs. The sub-functions of“Form Tea”
are described in the following paragraphs.
Figure 3.10: Form team EFFBD.
Monitor Frequency – This function provides the elements within the strike package with
the capability to monitor a wide spectrum of radio transmission frequency for the purpose
of communications with allied units and within the strike package. This includes the simul-
taneous monitoring of both civilian and military frequency of 121.5 MHz (International Air
Distress) and 243.0 MHz (Military Air Distress), respectively.
Perform Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) – This function provides the capability for
the elements within the strike package to interrogate, authenticate and identify external
systems as either a friendly or unidentified system.
Establish Communications – This function enables the elements within the strike pack-
age to establish secured and LPI communications within the package. The elements are
equipped with the necessary emissions control (EMCON) protocols and cryptography.
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3.7.4 Generate Assets
Figure 3.11 shows the functional decomposition of the “Generate Assets” function. This
function defines the ability to perform aircraft generation. The capability includes all lo-
gistics and administrative support necessary for the expeditious generation of both manned
and unmanned air assets. The following paragraphs describe the sub-functions of “Gener-
ate Asset.”
Figure 3.11: Generate assets EFFBD.
Load Threat Data – This function enables the loading of the threat library in the appro-
priate format onto the air asset, regardless of the medium. The threat data provides the air
asset with an onboard autonomous threat avoidance capability based on the threat detected.
Refuel Aircraft – This function enables the expeditious refuel of the air asset in preparation
for the mission.
Re-arm Aircraft – This function provides the capability to expeditious load the necessary
weapons and munitions onto the aircraft in preparation for the mission. The munitions may
include all applicable air-to-surface, air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons and munitions.
Pre-flight Aircraft – This function provides the logistics support capability to perform the
necessary operational and maintenance inspections and tests to ascertain that the aircraft is
airworthy and mission capable.
Perform End-of-Runway Checks – This function provides the capability for the aircraft
to be given a final check by the crew chief prior to the aircraft taking off.
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3.7.5 Plan Mission
Figure 3.12 shows the functional decomposition of the “Plan Mission” function. This func-
tion provides the capability to perform and coordinate joint mission-planning between two
or more mission planning facilities. This provides the capability to communicate through
verbal, imagery and video, the information necessary for joint mission-planning with an
off-site mission planning facility. The following paragraphs decribe the sub-functions
for“Plan Mission.”
Figure 3.12: Plan mission EFFBD.
Review Orders – This function provides the capability to review the mission tasking order
received.
Review Intelligence – This function provides the capability to review and analyze the in-
telligence provided for the purpose of developing the threat data for the mission.
Forecast Weather – This function provides the capability to obtain or receive weather
forecast over the area of operations for the purpose of mission planning.
Generate Targets – This function provides the capability for the joint mission-planning
team comprising of the mission planners onboard the aircraft carrier and the CVEX 2 to
generate a target list for the mission.
Determine Assets – This function provides the capability for the joint mission-planning
team to determine and allocate the assets for the mission. This includes the holistic visi-
bility of the availability of assets embarked on all launch platform tasked by the mission
order.
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Determine Weapons – This function provides the capability for determination of the ap-
propriate weapons to be employed against the assigned targets.
Assign Targets – This function provides the capability to assign targets to the selected
assets. Depending on the target characteristics, specific targets may be assigned to a specific
assets employing a specific weapon.
Generate Plan – This function provides the capability to generate the final mission plan
for both manned and unmanned assets. The plan contains all the required information for
the conduct of the mission.
3.7.6 Service Target
The decomposition for this function was shown previously in Figure 3.6. This function
delivers the capability to locate, identify, and engage the target. This function and its sub-
functions are traditionally known as the kill chain. Recall that for this study, the USMC
kill chain is used.
Find Target – This function provides the capability to detect targets through the utilization
of various means. Such means may include imagery, video, and electronic means.
Fix Target – This function provides the capability to determine the location of a target, in
particular, its location relative to the system as well as its geo-location.
Track Target – The tracking function provides the capability to continuously geo-locate
the target relative to the system.
Generate Target Solution – This function provides the system with the capability to gen-
erate the necessary information, such as weapons release point, for a particular target based
on ownship pose and the existing environmental and atmospheric conditions to achieve the
highest probability of hit by the weapon.




Figure 3.13 shows the functional decomposition of the “Transit System” function. This
function delivers the capability for the system to transit from one point to another.
Figure 3.13: Transit system EFFBD.
Navigate Asset – This function provides the system with the capability to perform navi-
gation to a desired location based on inputs from both Earth-based, onboard and off-board
navigation systems and beacons.
Provide Thrust – The function provides an organic system capability to provide a motive
force to achieve translation.
Maneuver Asset – This function provides the system with the ability to change its pose,
speed, heading or location in space.
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3.8 Function to Operational Activity Mapping
With the identification and definition of the functions for a MUM-T (strike) operation, the
functions are then mapped to the operational activities. The operational activities for a
MUM-T (strike) operation shown previously in Figure 3.2. Table 3.2 shows the mapping
of functions that are identified to implement the specific operational activities.




TA Threat assessment MUMT.Func.2 Assess threats
MUM.T.Func.2.1 Receive intelligence














MUM.T.Strike.1 Launch manned MUMT.Func.4 Generate assets
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UCAV.APG Launch UCAV MUMT.Func.4 Generate assets




MUM.T.Strike.2 Transit to RV point MUMT.Func.1 Execute C2




MUM.T.Strike.3 Airborne link-up MUMT.Func.1 Execute C2








INGRESS Covert ingress MUMT.Func.1 Execute C2
MUMT.Func.1.1 Provide battlespace
awareness
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USMC.KC Find, Fix, Track MUMT.Func.6 Servie target
Target, Engage MUMT.Func.6.1 Find target
MUMT.Func.6.2 Fix target
MUMT.Func.6.3 Track target
MUMT.Func.6.4 Generate target solution
MUMT.Func.6.5 Engage target
MUMT.Func.6.6 Assess effects
EGRESS Covert egress MUMT.Func.1 Execute C2
MUMT.Func.1.1 Provide battlespace
awareness















3.9 Function to Component Mapping
Next, the functions are mapped to the components of the SoS. The components of the SoS
are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Components of the MUM-T (strike) system of systems.
Component Description




An unmanned carrier-based unmanned stealth aircraft capa-
ble of weapons employment.
Intelligence team Responsible for the threat assessment and the generation of








Responsible for the generation of mission-capable fighter
aircraft, and the launch and recovery of the fighter aircraft.
Launch platform
(CVEX 2)
Responsible for the generation of mission-capable UCAV,
and the launch and recovery of the UCAVs.
Table 3.4 shows the mapping of functions to components. This mapping is accomplished
using Vitech CORE 9. The heuristics algorithm within Vitech CORE ensures that each
function is only allocated to (performed by) one component. However, a component may
be allocated to (perform) one or more functions.
Table 3.4: Function-to-component mapping.
Function Function Description Performed by
MUMT.Func Perform MUM-T Strike MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.1 Execute C2 Manned fighter
MUMT.Func.1.1 Provide battlespace awareness Manned fighter
MUMT.Func.1.2 Exercise positive control Manned fighter
MUMT.Func.1.3 Exercise command Manned fighter
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – Continued from previous page
Function Function Description Performed by
MUMT.Func.2 Assess threats Intelligence team
MUMT.Func.2.1 Receive intelligence Intelligence team
MUMT.Func.2.2 Process intelligence Intelligence team
MUMT.Func.2.3 Classify intelligence Intelligence team
MUMT.Func.2.4 Disseminate intelligence Intelligence team
MUMT.Func.3 Form team MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.3.1 Monitor frequency MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.3.2 Perform IFF MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.3.3 Establish communications MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.4 Generate assets Launch platforms
MUMT.Func.4.1 Load threat data Launch platforms
MUMT.Func.4.2 Refuel aircraft Launch platforms
MUMT.Func.4.3 Re-arm aircraft Launch platforms
MUMT.Func.4.4 Pre-flight aircraft Launch platforms
MUMT.Func.5 Plan mission Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.1 Review orders Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.2 Review intelligence Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.3 Forecast weather Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.4 Generate targets Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.5 Determine assets Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.6 Determine weapons Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.7 Deteremine personnel Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.8 Assign targets Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.5.9 Generate plan Joint mission-planning team
MUMT.Func.6 Service target MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.6.1 Find target Unmanned aircraft
MUMT.Func.6.2 Fix target Unmanned aircraft
MUMT.Func.6.3 Track target Unmanned aircraft
MUMT.Func.6.4 Target target Unmanned aircraft
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – Continued from previous page
Function Function Description Performed by
MUMT.Func.6.5 Engage target MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.6.6 Assess effects Unmanned aircraft
MUMT.Func.7 Transit assets MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.7.1 Navigate assets MUM-T (strike) package
MUMT.Func.7.2 Provide thrust MUM-T (strike) package




This chapter discusses the models developed in this study. All models are developed in
ExtendSim 9.0 simulation software. SAS Institute Inc.’s JMP Pro 10 and Microsoft’s Excel
are used for analysis of results. The chapter first describes the approach, assumptions
and considerations used in developing the models. The chapter then describes the models
developed and use for the DRM and analysis.
4.1 Modeling Approach
A kill chain is fundamentally a series of processes, that when executed successfully in the
prescribed sequence, leads to the destruction of a objective or target. ExtendSim 9.0 is a
simulation program that can be used for modeling discrete event processes. ExtendSim
allows the modeling of simulation items that are generated and processed by discrete activ-
ities as the items travel through the model along a defined path. Activity blocks along the
path simulate the performance of service or impose delays on the items. Attributes can be
assigned to each simulation item to facilitate the understanding of the behavior and traits
of the item as it moves through the model.
4.2 Measures of Effectiveness
The efficiency of the kill chain process can be measured by the time it takes to complete
the entire process. The faster the entire kill chain is executed, the less time the assets are
exposed to danger. A shorter execution time also translates into a higher sortie generation
rate. Thus, to evaluate the effectiveness of the MUM-T (strike) for the design reference
mission, the following measure of effectiveness (MOE) are used. They are described in the
following paragraphs.




4.2.1 Total Mission Time
This MOE measures the efficiency of the entire strike force, including those elements
within the expanded kill chain. The mission completion time is calculated as:
Total Mission Time = Force Generation Time + Transition to Rendezvous Point Time +
Airborne Link Up Time + Ingress Time + F2T2E Cycle Time + Egress Time
Force Generation Time – This refers to the time to generate the necessary assets for the
mission. It includes the generation of fighters and UCAVs and is measured from the time
an asset is assigned for the mission to the time the asset takes off for the mission.
Transition to Rendezvous Point Time – This refers to the time it takes the assets to transit
from the launch platform to the rendezvous point. It is dependent on the distance between
the launch platform and the rendezvous point and the cruising speed of the asset. For this
study, a rendezvous point that is equally distance from both launch platform is assumed for
each simulation run. It is measured from the time the asset takes off to the time it reaches
the rendezvous point.
Airborne Link-up Time – This refers to the time it takes for the entire MUM-T (strike)
package to be formed. Recall that, for the purpose of this study, a MUM-T (strike) package
consists of four MUM-T (strike) units of a fighter paired with two UCAVs. Should a
fighter reach the rendezvous point before two UCAVs are available for link-up, the fighter
is assumed to be hold at the rendezvous point and await the arrival of two UCAVs before
the link up is performed. The time is measured from the time the first fighter or UCAV
takes off to the time the MUM-T (strike) package is formed.
Ingress / Egress Time – This is the time it takes for the MUM-T (strike) package to ingress
and egress from the rendezvous point to the area of operations. For the purpose of this study,
it is assumed that both the ingress and egress distance is the same. The time necessary for
evasive actions to counter adversary counter-air is assumed to be zero.
“Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage” Cycle Time This is the time it takes the UCAVs to
find, fix, track, target and engage the assigned targets.
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4.2.2 Mission Time
This MOE measures the airborne time required to perform the mission. It includes the time
to transit to the rendezvous point, the time to form the MUM-T (strike) package, the time
to cycle through the kill chain and both the time for the package to ingress and egress. The
Mission Time is calculated as:
Mission Time = Transition to Rendezvous Point Time + Airborne Link Up Time + Ingress
Time + F2T2E Cycle Time + Egress Time
The reason for specifically breaking out Mission Time is to reveal the amount of time the
aircraft are required to be airborne. As the manned fighters have a limited endurance of
about two hours, the airborne time is critical to the successful completion of the strike
operation.
4.2.3 Rendezvous (RV) Time
The RV Time is the time required to form up the MUM-T (strike) package consisting of
four pairs of MUM-T teams. Each team consists of one manned fighter paired with, and
having positive control of, two unmanned assets. The time is measured from the time the
first asset (fighter or UCAV) arrives at the rendezvous point to the time the MUM-T (strike)
package is formed. The RV time is calculated as:
RV Time = (Time at Formation of MUM-T (strike) package) – (Time at First Aircraft
Arrival at Rendezvous Point)
Manned-unmanned teaming introduces the unique requirement to establish a communi-
cation and command data link to form the MUM-T (strike) package. Recall that in the
mission definition described in Section 3.5, this is performed in the air at the rendezvous
point. The RV Time enables the measurement of the time required to form strike package.
4.2.4 Measure of Performance
From the MOEs described above, the following MOPs are identified.
1. Airborne Link-up Time
2. F2T2E Cycle Time
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3. Fighter Generation Time
4. UCAV Generation Time
Both the Fighter and UCAV Generation Times are broken down into the specific tasks





The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the platforms described in the
DRM.
4.3.1 F-35 Lightning II
The F-35 Lightning II is a fifth-generation VLO manned fighter. In its stealth configuration,
the weapons are carried in the internal weapons bay. The F-35C is designed to operate from
aircraft carriers. The F-35C has an endurance of just over two hours with two JDAMs and
two air-to-air missiles. The F-35 Lightning II employs the electro-optic targeting system
(EOTS) for target location, identification and designation. The EOTS can operate in both
air-to-air and air-to-ground mode, and includes capabilities of long range infrared search
and track (IRST) and laser designation and spot tracking functions. As the performance
specifications of the EOTS are classified, a set of representative performance specifications
is used for modeling. Table 4.1 shows the representative performance specifications used
for modeling and the stage of the kill chain that the specification is applicable to. For the
purpose of this study, it is assumed that the EOTS is also employed on the UCAV.
50
Table 4.1: EOTS specifications (representative) used for modeling
Description Performance Kill Chain Stage
Maximum Detection Range 60nm Find
Maximum contacts of interest (COI) Detection 100 Find
Minimum Time to Detect 0.01 Find
Maximum Simultaneous Track 20 Fix, Track
Minimum Time to Fix Track 0.05 Fix, Track
Maximum Simultaneous Target 1 Target
Maximum Simultaneous Attack 1 Engage
Time to Engage 2 seconds Engage
4.3.2 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle - X-47X
The X-47X is a fictitious weaponized, stealth UCAV used in this study. The X-47X per-
formance specifications is based largely on the X-47B. It has a projected weapons payload
of 4,500 pounds. It possesses advanced LPI datalinks and is capable of airspeeds in excess
of 400 knots. The X-47X can be embarked on an aircraft carrier or a CVEX 2 vessel. The
X-47X is planned to be fielded beyond the 2020 time-frame. Figure 4.1 shows the specifi-
cations of the Northrop Grumman X-47B [31]. The figure also shows the relative size of
the X-47B against the F/A-18E/F.
Figure 4.1: Nothtrop Grumman X-47B specifications [31].
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4.3.3 GBU-39, Small Diameter Bomb
The GBU-39 SDB is a 250-pound class wing-bomb equipped with inertia navigation sys-
tem (INS) and Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance system. It is suitable for ser-
vicing fixed and stationary targets, such as buildings, roads and parked aircraft. The bomb
can be employed in all weather conditions and has a standoff range of up to 60nm. It uses
its onboard INS and an anti-jam GPS to fly towards the target. Its accuracy is augmented
by a differential GPS system, providing flight path corrections to enhance accuracy. The
GBU-39 has a reported circular error probable (CEP) of 3 meters [32]. The GBU-39 is
currently integrated with the F-15, but there are integration efforts for the GBU-39 to be
employed by the F-35 and UCAV [33].
4.4 ExtendSim Model
For the initial study, two models are developed in ExtendSim 9.0. The first model addresses
the processes for the USMC Kill Chain – F2T2E. The second model includes the additional
activities of the expanded kill chain. Activities in the expanded kill chain include the activ-
ities associated with asset generation, airborne link-up, ingress and egress. For consistency,
the following text style is applied to refer to the various elements in the simulation model.
• Sentence case in italics – ExtendSim simulation block type
• “Italic Title Text in Parenthesis” – Specific ExtendSim simulation block label
The basic processes of the kill chain is modeled using Activity blocks. Each target in the
target list is represented as an “item” in the simulation. “Items” are generated by the Create
block. A Queue block is used as a holding tank to hold the “items” in queue should the
capacity of the Activity block be used up. A “First-in, First-out” queue policy is adopted
for all Queue blocks. Each block contains specific parameters that can be defined to enable
the modeling of specific system characteristics or performance specifications. Table 4.2
presents selected parameters of the blocks.
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Table 4.2: ExtendSim modeling block parameters
Block Type Parameters
Create Creation Schedule, Number to Create
Activity Capacity, Delay Time
Queue Maximum Queue Length, Sort Policy, Renege Time Limit
4.4.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions are made for the model.
1. All detected COIs can be identified and classified. However, the maximum num-
ber of COIs that can be identified and classified depends on the sensor performance
specifications.
2. Targeting system performance degradation as a result of atmospheric conditions are
not considered.
3. All tracked targets are targeted. The capacity of targeting is determined by the system
limitations.
4. The system is operating in air-to-ground (look down) with heavy ground clutter.
5. No defensive counter-air is encountered due to the covert ingress and detection avoid-
ance actions employed by the UCAVs and with the manned fighters remaining out-
side the ADIZ.
6. The UCAV used in this study employs the same targeting system as the fighter.
7. There are no false alarms. All targets detected are legitimate and are an assigned
target.
8. Each target is serviced by one weapon. Should the weapon not destroy the target,
there will not be a subsequent attempt to service that target again.
9. All assets are refueled at the end of the last flight.
10. There is no degradation in the pilot’s performance due to the increased workload of
having to control two unmanned aircraft.
11. The triangular distribution is used to define the distribution of the cycle times for the
activities in the kill chain.
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4.5 Kill Chain Model
The first model is that of the USMC kill chain. This model enables us to determine the
time required to execute the USMC kill chain. The times obtained are used as inputs for
the second model, which models the expanded kill chain. In the expanded kill chain model
(see Section 4.6), the USMC kill chain is modeled as a single activity block. The kill chain
model is used to generate 500 simulation runs of the USMC kill chain. The outputs from
this model are the mission success rate and the cycle time for the servicing of 64 targets
through the kill chain. Targets are defined to appear according to a Poisson distribution
with a λ of 0.5 seconds. The total targets assigned is equal to the weapons load out for the
eight UCAV. Assuming each UCAV is capable of a 4,500 lbs payload. Each UCAV can
carry 2 x 2,000 lbs JDAM or 8 x 250 lbs GBU-39 (SDB). To maximize target servicing,
each UCAV has a weapons load out of 8 x SDBs, giving a total target servicing capacity of
64 targets.
For this model, the assumption is that the UCAVs ingress at a speed of 400 knots at an
altitude of 30,000 feet. Targeting is performed in a look-down attitude with high ground
clutter. Weather conditions is assumed to be ideal over the target. Figure 4.2 shows the
envisaged profile used for the model. A straight-in approach towards the target is assumed.
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Figure 4.2: Profile used to determine modeling parameters, including spatial dimensions. This
profile is used to determine the maximum allowable time for the completion of each activity in
the kill chain. Maximum allowable time is based on distance away from target and ingress speed
of the UCAV.
Find – The “Find” process is started at 60 nm out from expected target location and must
complete by 40 nm. The “Find” process occurs concurrently as the UCAV ingress towards
the target. Thus, the maximum time it has to find the target is three minutes. If the latitude
and longitude of the target is known, the find is expected to take very little time (minimum
of 0.5 minutes). It is assumed that it most likely takes the UCAV 1.5 minutes to find
the target. A triangular distribution is assumed for this process. Based on the author’s
professional experience, a probability of detection of 0.90 is assigned for a scenario where
the targeting system is at altitude, looking down with heavy ground clutter. Should the
target not be detected by 40 nm from the target, the UCAV must execute a go-around and
re-establish the strike profile setup. This is expected to take between 2.5 to 5 minutes, with
a most likely time of 3 minutes. A triangular distribution is also assumed for this process.
Fix – Upon finding the target, the UCAV will “Fix” onto the target. Again, this process
occurs concurrently as the UCAV ingress towards the target. The “Fix” must be completed
within 20 nm from the target. Thus, the maximum time it has to fix the target is three
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minutes. Once found, the fix is relatively quick, requiring a minimum of 1 second, and a
most likely time of 5 seconds. A triangular distribution is assumed for this process.
Track and Target – When the target is fixed, the tracking continues and target solution
is generated to determine the release point of the weapon. This must be completed by
reaching 15 nm from the target. 15 nm is chosen as the SDB can be launched from 15
nm out. The maximum time available to track and target is 45 seconds. However, most
tracking and targeting is done automatically in the system and the minimum time take is
estimated to be 0.5 seconds, and a most likely time of 1 second.
Engage – Upon successful target solution generation, the engagement is performed with
weapon release. This is accomplished by opening the weapons bay doors and releasing the
weapon. This requires 2 seconds to open the door and release weapon. Although this is
performed concurrently with the UCAV ingress towards the target, the time is accounted
for towards the F2T2E timing.
Table 4.3 summarizes the distribution models used for the various operational activities in
the kill chain. The Queue blocks have a renege function defined, ensuring that a target
that stays in the Queue blocks beyond a specific amount of time leaves the queue and is
counted as not targeted and consequently not destroyed. In such instances, these targets
are considered to have “evaded” the kill chain. Targets that are not targeted, hit or killed
as determined by the probabilities assigned are called “leakers” and are considered to have
“leaked” through the kill chain. The probability of hit is calculated using the SDB’s CEP of
3m against an adversary aircraft on ground of dimensions 13 m wingspan and 20 m length
and assuming a Normal distribution for impacts.
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Tri(90, 300, 180) The time required to go-around and re-
set the strike approach.
Time to Fix Track [sec-
onds]
Tri(1,180,5) The time required to obtain a fix on a
target once it has been located.
Time to Track and Target
[seconds]
Tri(0.5,45,1) The time required to track the target
and generate a target solution.
Time to Engage [seconds] Tri(1.5, 2.5, 2.0) The time required to release the
weapon upon weapon release com-
mand. This includes the opening of the
weapon bay doors.
Probability of Detection 0.90 Probability that the target can be lo-
cated. Assumes a look down approach
with high ground clutter.
Probability of Target Solu-
tion
0.99 The probability that the target solution
generated is accurate.
Probability of Hit 0.98 Probability that the weapon will hit the
target.
Probability of Kill 0.85 Probability that the hit on the target
will destroy the target.
4.5.1 “Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage” Times
Figure 4.3 shows the model built in ExtendSim 9.0 for the USMC kill chain. This model
is used to determine the mean F2T2E times to service each target. It is assumed that each
UCAV is assigned a unique set of targets and is able to engage eight targets simultaneously.
The model is set up to return the mean time it takes a target to be processed through the
F2T2E kill chain. 500 simulation runs are conducted with the model and the mean target
servicing times for each run obtained. JMP Pro 10 was used to determine the approximate
distribution of the target servicing times. From the analysis (see Figure 4.4), the mean
target servicing time follows a Normal distribution with mean 4.373 minutes and a standard
deviation of 0.692 minutes.
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Figure 4.3: USMC kill chain modeled in ExtendSim. The model is segmented into three parts:
Creation and detection, tracking and targeting, and engagement. Features are included to ac-
count for “leakers,” targets that have “evaded” the kill chain, and the mission success rate.
Figure 4.4: Determination of distribution for mean F2T2E time
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4.5.2 Mission Success Rate
Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of the mission success rate (MSR) obtained for the 500
simulation runs.
Figure 4.5: Distribution of mission success rate, including mean and standard deviation.
The MSR results for the USMC kill chain model is shown to have a mean of 82.84%. This
is somewhat surprising given the high probability of hit and high probability of kill used in
the model and consequently, a higher MSR was expected. The analysis found that while
no targets were reneged from the queues, and all targets that appeared were eventually
detected and serviced through the kill chain, there was a significant percentage of targets
(17.16%) that leaked from the kill chain process. Recall that targets that are not targeted, hit
or killed as determined by the probabilities assigned are called “leakers” and are considered
to have “leaked” through the kill chain. These leaks occurred at the various stages where
a probability function was applied to the outcome of the respective kill chain process. A
sensitivity analysis is then performed to determine the effects these probabilities have on
the MSR. Table 4.4 shows the factors and their respective ranges used to determine which
had the highest effect on MSR.
Table 4.4: Factors and ranges for mission success rate analysis
Factor Range
Probability of Detection 0.5 to 0.9
Probability of Target Solution 0.8 to 0.99
Probability of Hit 0.7 to 0.98
Probability of Kill 0.7 to 0.9
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Figure 4.6 shows output from JMP Pro 10 on the main effects that each factor has on the
mission success rate.
Figure 4.6: Effect analysis of factors for mission success rate
From Figure 4.6, it can be observed that amongst the factors, the “probability of target”
factor has the largest effect on the mission success rate. The probabilities of detection, hit
and kill had a lesser effect on the mission success rate. Based on the coefficient estimates
for each factor, the effect on MSR from the “probability of target” factor is twice as large
as that from the “probability of kill” factor, and approximately 1.5 times that from the
“probability of hit” factor. It is of note that the probability of detection has little impact on
the mission success rate. This was because there are TTPs in place in the model to reset
the approach to ensure the detection of target and time required to perform the detection
is within the time limit to detect the targets before detection is no longer possible because
of the required engagement standoff range. It is also of note that whilst it is generally
acknowledged that a high probability of hit and kill would guarantee a successful kill of a
target, this simulation has shown that it may not necessarily be the case. The results suggest
that the critical factor in mission success rate is the quality of the target solution generated.
Figure 4.7 shows the prediction profiles for the factors with maximum desirability. The
desirability function in JMP Pro 10 enables the identification of the “best” or most desirable
response achievable based the response function (maximize, minimize or target) and all
factors. In this case, the response, MSR is to be maximized and the factors that provide the
maximum desirability is derived using the desirability feature.
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Figure 4.7: Predition profile for mission success rate for maximum desirability
With regard to maximizing desirability, Figure 4.7 shows the ideal values for each of the
probabilities to maximize the mission success rate. It is of note that the upper bounds of
these probabilities, for the purpose of this study, have been defined as very high. Even with
the high probabilities, the maximum expected mission success rate is 86.79 percent. In
reality, such high probabilities would be hard to achieve.
4.5.3 Insights from Kill Chain Model
The study of the F2T2E kill chain model has shown that while the weapon performance
such as probability of hit and probability of kill has a direct effect on the mission success
rate, the performance of the targeting system has the largest impact. A weapon’s effective-
ness is only as effective as the accuracy of the target information that it is supplied with. Of
the five processes in the kill chain, four components, namely “find, fix, track and target,”
pertain specifically to the generation of an accurate target solution.
4.6 Baseline Expanded Kill Chain Model
The subsequent simulation model built is that for the baseline expanded kill chain. This
simulation model takes the F2T2E kill chain and expands it to include the activities neces-
sary to generate the aircraft (manned and unmanned) for the mission, the airborne link-up
between the fighter and the UCAVs and the ingress and egress portion of the mission. The
operational activities in this kill chain is shown in Figure 3.2. The additional operational
activities include threat assessment, mission planning, manned and unmanned aircraft gen-
eration, transition to rendezvous point, airborne link-up between manned and unmanned
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aircraft, ingress and egress, and return to base. Figure 4.8 shows the simulation model built
in ExtendSim for the expanded kill chain.
Figure 4.8: Expanded kill chain simulation model. This simulation model shows the five parts
of the expanded kill chain, namely the two parallel processes in manned and unmanned aircraft
generation, the formation of the MUM-T (strike) package, the ingress of the strike package
towards the target, and the execution of the USMC kill chain and subsequent egress and return
to base. Within the simulation model, information on the attributes of the simulation items are
extracted and written to the database to determine the values of the measures of effectiveness.
The activity blocks and their respective parameters are modeled using open source perfor-
mance specifications as well as the author’s professional experiences. The study assumes
that the period for the scenario (Section 3.2) is in the 202X timeframe. The F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) is used as the manned fighter in the modeling. For the projected capa-
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bilities of a UCLASS system, the X-47B is used as a representative system for the future
UCAV platform.
4.6.1 Model Description
This model excludes the activities of threat assessment, mission planning and intelligence
debrief because these do not directly impact the time taken to execute the mission from the
manned and unmanned systems’ perspective. Similarly, intelligence debrief is not included
as it is a post-mission function. The expanded kill chain model is divided into three major
parts. The parts are described in the following paragraphs.
Part 1 - Fighter (FTR) Asset Generation and UCAV Asset Generation
This part of the simulation model simulates the aircraft generation activities that are nec-
essary to generate a mission-capable fighter or UCAV. The simulation includes the process
of aircraft selection, weapons loading, fighter and UCAV pre-flight inspections, and fighter
and UCAV EOR inspections. Figure 4.9 Figure 4.10 show the simulation model for manned
fighter and UCAV generation respectively. The details of each block are described in the
following paragraphs.
Figure 4.9: Fighter asset generation simulation model. These simulation blocks simulate the
fighter aircraft generation process and includes the re-arming of the fighter aircraft, the pre-
flight inspection that is performed and the end-of-runway inspection prior to the fighter aircraft
taking off.
Figure 4.10: UCAV asset generation simulation model. These simulation blocks simulate the
UCAV generation process and includes the re-arming of the UCAV, the pre-flight inspection that
is performed and the end-of-runway inspection prior to the UCAV aircraft taking off.
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Select FTR and Select UCAV – The “Select FTR” block is used to model the fighter aircaft
selection. An item (fighter aircraft or UCAV) is generated based on a random uniform
integer distribution, Uniform(1,2).
Re-Arm FTR and Re-Arm UCAV – The “Re-Arm FTR” and “Re-Arm UCAV” blocks
models the process of weapons loading for the selected fighter or UCAV respectively. A
lognormal distribution for the re-arming time is used for both, with a specified minimum
time to re-arm defined in the distribution.
Pre-flight – Once the fighter aircraft or UCAV is re-armed, it undergoes a pre-flight in-
spection (“Pre-Flight” blocks). The time required to perform the pre-flight check is also
assumed to be lognormal with a specified minimum time to complete.
EOR(FTR) and EOR(UCAV) – Upon completion of pre-flight inspections, the fighter
aircraft or UCAV undergoes an EOR inspection before it takes off, “EOR(FTR)” or
“EOR(UCAV)” block. The process time for EOR checks is assumed to be lognormal with
a specified minimum time to complete.
Queue blocks – Queue blocks are placed before every activity block to hold any items that
is waiting to be processed by any of the activity process blocks.
Set Take Off Time – The Equation block , “Set Take Off Time,” calculates the total
time taken to generate one mission-capable asset for fighter asset generation track and the
UCAV asset generation track. It is essentially the time at when the asset takes off. The Get
blocks enables the extraction of the calulcated take off time.
Part 2 - Airborne Link-up and Formation of Strike Package
Figure 4.11 shows model for the transit of assets to the rendezvous point and the subsequent
establishment of communications and command link (link-up) between the fighters with the
UCAVs to form MUM-T (strike) units. Upon the completion of link up of four MUM-T
(strike) units, the MUM-T (strike) package is formed and proceeds to ingress.
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Figure 4.11: Airborne link-up and formation of strike package model
Forming the MUM-T (strike) Package – In the model, each fighter and UCAV is gen-
erated individually during the asset generation phase. However, upon take off and transit
to the rendezvous point, the fighters and UCAV will link up and move through the model
as a single item. The Batch block is used to model the forming of MUM-T (strike)
units consisting of one fighter teamed with two UCAVs. The conditions within the batch-
ing block is set to generate a new simulation item (MUM-T (strike) unit) when one fighter
and two UCAVs arrive. The Batch block is again used to model the forming of a MUM-T
(strike) Package consisting of four MUM-T (strike) units.
Part 3 - Ingress, “Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage” and Egress
Figure 4.12 shows the model ingress, target engagment and egress of the strike package.
Covert Ingress – The time for the strike package to ingress depends on the distance be-
tween the rendezvous point and the target location. This distance is a randomly generated
number, in nautical miles, using a uniform distribution, Uniform (200, 400) and serves
as the input to the “Covert Ingress.” The “Covert Egress” block uses the same generated
number, in nautical miles. The strike package ingress speed is constrained to the slower of
the cruise speeds between the fighter and UCAV. Recall that for this simulation, the cruise
speed of the UCAV is slower and assumed to be 400 knots.
Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage – Upon arriving at the target location, the process
of“Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage” is executed. The delay time to perform this is based
on the distribution of the time to complete the kill chain. The distribution that was de-
termined from Section 4.5 is used. Recall that the distribution for the USMC kill chain
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Figure 4.12: Strike package ingress, target engagement and strike package egress model
process is a Normal distribution with a mean of 4.373 minutes and a standard deviation of
0.0692 minutes.
Covert Egress – The time for the strike package to egress depends on the distance between
the target location and the rendezvous point. For the purpose of this simulation, it is as-
sumed that the distance to egress is the same as that for ingress. Recall that the number, in
nautical miles, generated during the determination of ingress distance is used here as well.
This ensures that the distance to cover during ingress between the rendezvous point and the
target previously determined is consistent with the distance to cover during egress.
Extract Mission Times – The two Mission Times, Total Mission Time and Mission Time,
is calculated in through the use of an Equation block .
Get Block – This block facilitates the extraction of the calculated Mission Times.
Database Update – The extracted Mission Times are updated into the database for post-
processing. This is performed using the Database write block .
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Exit Block – The Exit block allows the simulation item to exit. The exit of the item
also marks the end of one simulation run.
Table 4.5 summarizes the model parameters used in the expanded kill chain model. The
ExtendSim block, as shown in Figure 4.8 previously, corresponding to the parameter is
indicated in parenthesis.




Re-arm fighters cycle time (Re-arm FTR)
Re-arming capacity (Re-arm FTR)
Pre-flight inspection of fighters cycle time (FTR Pre-flight)
Pre-flight inspection of fighters capacity (FTR Pre-flight)
Fighter End-of-Runway inspection cycle time (EOR(FTR))
Fighter End-of-Runway inspection capacity (EOR(FTR))
UCAV ASSET GENERATION
Re-arm UCAV cycle time (Re-arm UCAV)
Re-arming capacity (Re-arm UCAV)
Pre-flight inspection of UCAV cycle time (UCAV Pre-flight)
Pre-flight inspection of UCAV capacity (UCAV Pre-flight)
UCAV End-of-Runway inspection cycle time (EOR(UCAV))
UCAV End-of-Runway inspection capacity (EOR(UCAV))
AIRBORNE LINK-UP AND FORMATION OF STRIKE PACKAGE
Distance from launch platforms to rendezvous point (Range to RV Point)
Time for fighter to transit to rendezvous point (Transit to RV (FTR))
Time for UCAV to transit to rendezvous point (Transit to RV (UCAV))
Criteria to form MUM-T (strike) unit (MUMT RV)
Airborne data and command link-up cycle time (Airborne Link-up)
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Table 4.5 – Continued from previous page
Parameters (ExtendSim Block)
Criteria to form MUM-T (strike) package (Form Strike Pkg)
STRIKE PACKAGE INGRESS TOWARDS TARGET
Distance from rendezvous point to target (Range to TGT Point)
Time to ingress from rendezvous point to target (Covert Ingress)
SERVICE TARGET
Time to execute “F2T2E” kill chain (F2T2E)
Time to egress from target to rendezvous point (Covert Egress)
4.6.2 Model Factors
JMP Pro 10 was used to develop the factorial combinations for the model. Three responses
and nine factors were used. The first eight factors applies to asset generation times, while
the ninth, airborne link up cycle time, applies to the MUM-T (strike) package formation
time. For the purpose of modeling, the lower and upper bound of each factor was used. The
factors used are described in Table 4.6. A fractional factorial design approach was used
to generate the combinations. From this, a total of 64 combinations are generated. One
hundred simulation runs is conducted for each combination, giving a total of 6,400 runs.
One hundred runs is used to provide a sufficiently large enough sample size to estimate
to obtain an asymptotically normal estimator of the mean values of the factors. For each
combination, the mean of the Total Mission Time, Mission Time and RV Time is recorded.
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Table 4.6: Design of experiment factors.
Response Goal
Total Mission Time Minimize
Mission Time Minimize
Airborne Link Up Time Minimize
Factor Lower Bound Upper Bound
Fighter Re-Arm 35 mins 45 mins
Fighter Pre-Flight 30 mins 50 mins
Fighter EOR 3 mins 10 mins
UCAV Re-Arm 30 mins 50 mins
UCAV Pre-Flight 10 mins 30 mins
UCAV EOR 3 mins 10 mins
Airborne Link Up Cycle Time 1 min 10 mins
4.7 Results Analysis
The analysis methodology and results from the simulation runs are discussed in this section.
4.7.1 Analysis Methodology
The results from the simulation runs of the 64 combinations are then analyzed in JMP
Pro 10 to identify the factors that provided the most impact on the main effects. First, the
effects analysis is performed to identify the factors and interactions with the largest effect.
Next, the desirability function is used to determine the values of the factors that provide
the most desirable response behavior. For this study, only the main effects are studied.
Therefore, two or more factor interactions are ignored and pooled. The values are then
used as the baseline factor parameter settings in the analysis of alternatives.
4.7.2 Total Mission Time
Figure 4.13 shows the factors, including interactions between the factors, that had the
largest effect on the Total Mission Time. Ignoring two or more factor interactions, it is
observed that the Fighter Pre-flight, Fighter and UCAV Re-arm are the top three factors
had the highest main effects on the Total Mission Time.
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Figure 4.13: Effects analysis showing the factors with the largest effect on Total Mission Time.
Only factors with significant effects (p-value ≤ 0.05) are shown.)
Figure 4.14 shows the prediction profiler output for Total Mission Time. In this case, mini-
mizing Total Mission Time achieves maximum desirability. The steepness of the prediction
trace implies the factor’s importance. As observed, the trace for Fighter Pre-flight factor
has the steepest trace amongst the seven factors. The values for each of the seven factors
that give the maximum desirability is shown (in red) in the figure. It is also interesting to
note that both Fighter and UCAV EOR, and UCAV Pre-flight factors have no significant
effect on the Total Mission Times. Marginal effects were also observed for the Linkup
Time factor. The lowest predicted Total Mission Time is 276.15 minutes, or 4 hours and 36
minutes.
Figure 4.14: Prediction profiler for Total Mission Time with maximum desirability. Factors with
the largest effect exhibit the steepest trace.
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4.7.3 Mission Time
Figure 4.15 shows the factors, including the interactions between the factors, that had the
largest effect on the Mission Time. Ignoring two or more factor interactions, it is observed
that the Fighter Pre-flight, UCAV Re-arm, and Linkup Time factors are the top three factors
with the highest main effects on the Mission Time.
Figure 4.15: Effects analysis of factors for Mission Time. Only factors with significant effects
(p-value ≤ 0.05) are shown.)
Recall that Mission Time measures the time that the assets are airborne. From the results,
the two of the three factors that had the greatest impact on the Mission Times are the
activities on ground and performed prior to the aircraft taking off. The factors with large
main effects are:
1. UCAV Re-Arm (Re-arming of UCAV)
2. FTR Pre-Flt (Pre-flight inspection of manned fighter)
3. Linkup Time (Establishment of communications and command link up between one
UCAV and one manned fighter)
This points to one interesting insight – that in missions where assets are generated from
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different launch platforms, synchronization of launches, and consequently the asset gener-
ation activities, is critical in ensuring that the airborne rendezvous time is minimized.
Figure 4.16 shows the prediction profile output for Mission Time. As previously observed,
UCAV and Fighter Re-arm and Fighter Pre-flight had significant effects on the Mission
Time. Both Fighter and UCAV EOR had no effect on the Mission Time. It is also noted
that, airborne link-up had little effect on Mission Time. The lowest predicted Mission Time
for this scenario is 195.87 minutes, or 3 hours and 52 minutes.
Figure 4.16: Prediction profiler for Mission Time with maximum desirability. Factors with the
largest effect exhibit the steepest trace.
4.7.4 Rendezvous Time
Figure 4.17 shows the factors that has the largest effect on the RV Time. From the plot,
it is observed that the Fighter Pre-flight, UCAV Re-arm and Linkup Time factors has the
highest main effects on the RV Time.
Figure 4.17: Effects analysis showing the factors with the largest main effects on RV Time. Only
factors with significant effects (p-value ≤ 0.05) are shown.)
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Figure 4.18 shows the prediction profiler output for RV Time. Similar to the plots for
the afore-mentioned MOEs, the steepness of the prediction trace implies the factor’s im-
portance. As observed, the trace for “FTR Pre-Flt” and “UCAV Re-Arm” appear to have
the steepest trace amongst the seven factors. Unlike the prediction profile plots for the
other MOEs, two of the traces in the prediction profile plot for RV Time exhibit a negative
gradient. The trace for “UCAV Pre-Flt” and “UCAV EOR” factors exhibit an observable
negative gradient, indicating that an increase in the cycle times for these two activities actu-
ally results in a reduction in the RV Time. The lowest predicted RV Time for this scenario
is 116.46 minutes, or 1 hour 57 minutes.
Figure 4.18: Prediction profiler for RV Time with maximum desirability. Factors with the largest
effect exhibit the steepest trace.
4.8 Summary of Effects
Table 4.7 shows the top three factors with the highest main effects for the respective MOEs.
Table 4.7: Summary of factors with the highest main effects on MOE.
Measure of Effectiveness Factors with Largest Main Effects
Fighter pre-flight inspection
Total Mission Time UCAV re-arming
Fighter re-arming
UCAV re-arming
Mission Time Fighter pre-flight inspection
Airborne link-up time
Fighter pre-flight inspection
RV Time UCAV re-arming
Airborne link-up time
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The table shows that there are common factors that have a large effect on all three MOEs.
For manned aircraft, the pre-flight inspection and re-arming cycle times are the factors
with the largest main effects. For unmanned aircraft, the re-arming cycle time has the
largest main effect. The establishment of data and command link-up between manned and
unmanned aircraft also has a significant effect on the MOEs that include airborne time as
one of its factors, namely Mission Time and RV Time.
4.9 Insights from Expanded Kill Chain Model
Recall that Total Mission Time is the time elapsed from the time the asset generation be-
gins to the time the strike package completes its egress and returns to the launch platforms.
The results demonstrate that the efficiency in asset generation has a significant effect on
the Total Mission Time. The results highlights the overall time required for the conduct
of the strike operation. This information will enable mission planners to plan aircraft as-
signments and aircraft generation activities more effectively to support multiple MUM-T
(strike) operations. In this scenario, with a mean Total Mission Time of 4 hours 36 min-
utes, the implication is that a maximum of three such strike operations can be executed in
a twenty-four hour window
Further, the results from the expanded kill chain model suggests that the limiting factor in
a MUM-T (strike) lies in the airborne formation of the MUM-T (strike) package. From the
simulation, either the fighter or the UCAV holding at the rendezvous point spends a signif-
icant amount of time. In the simulation for the baseline expanded kill chain model, there
is no attempt to synchronize the generation of manned and unmanned aircraft. As a result,
if a manned aircraft reaches the rendezvous point first and there is no unmanned aircraft
for it to establish the data and command link-up, the result is that the manned aircraft has
to hold at the rendezvous point and wait for the arrival of the unmanned aircraft. These
unsynchronized arrivals at the rendezvous points creates inefficiencies and also results in
precious airborne time wasted by the manned aircraft holding at the rendezvous point. The
following chapter proposes three alternatives. The alternatives proposed either aim to ex-
tend the endurance of the manned fighters or explore ways to minimize the Mission Time
through synchronization or changes in the activity sequence in the expanded kill chain.
The next chapter explores the various alternatives that could reduce the expected RV Times
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or increase the fighter’s endurance to meet the required RV Times.
75




Three alternatives are proposed in this study as possible solutions to enable the execution of
the MUM-T (Strike) mission. The identified main limiting factor was the limited endurance
of the fighters. The need for covert ingress precludes the carriage of external fuel tanks by
the fighters. The proposed alternatives either strives to extend the endurance of the fighters
or to maximize the effectiveness of the baseline endurance of the fighters. Each alternative
is analyzed for its benefits and challenges. A Pugh matrix is used to identify the most
feasible solution based on the results of this study.
5.1 Alternative 1 - Aerial Refueling Tanker Support
This alternative describes the provision of an airborne tanker at the rendezvous point to
extend the endurance of the fighters. Figure 5.1 shows the OV-1 of a possible CONOPS for
this alternative. The following paragraphs describe the CONOPS.
Figure 5.1: MUM-T (strike) operations with aerial refueling tanker support high-level operational
view, OV-1. While largely similar to the baseline CONOPS, this CONOPS includes the use of
an aerial refueling tanker to extend the endurance of the manned fighters.
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Prior to the launch of the fighters or the UCAVs, an aerial refueling tanker aircraft, for
example a KC-46, is prepositioned at the rendezvous point (1). The aerial refueling tanker
aircraft provides the capability to increase the endurance of the fighters to maintain posi-
tion at the rendezvous point while waiting for the form up of the MUM-T (strike) units.
Upon successful formation of the MUM-T (strike) package, the package ingresses covertly
towards the target (2). Meanwhile, the aerial refueling tanker will return to base. The
UCAVs then enter the ADIZ and proceeds to engage the targets (3). Upon completion of
the engagement, the package egresses covertly back to their respective recovery platforms.
5.1.1 Analysis of Alternative 1
One of the benefits of the MUM-T (strike) concept is the reduced exposure to threats to
BLUELAND personnel while increasing the target servicing capacity of the BLUELAND
strike force. While the use of aerial refueling tanker aircraft provides the benefits of extend-
ing the range and endurance of the fighters, and consequently the MUM-T (strike) package,
this alternative also presents certain challenges and constraints.
First, the aerial refueling tanker aircraft is a high-value asset, thus it would have to be
deployed to the rendezvous point with fighter escorts. This increases the resources required
to carry out the strategic strike mission.
Second, although the aerial refueling tanker aircraft is stationed outside the REDLAND
ADIZ, it would be still within range of REDLAND defensive counter-air. This puts the
aerial refueling tanker aircraft at risk.
Third, the use of an aerial refueling tanker aircraft from the Air Force requires cross-service
coordination, potentially increasing the mission planning and execution complexity. Close
coordination will be required between the strike package launch platforms and the aerial
refueling tanker aircraft launch platform to ensure that the on-station time for the tanker
aircraft is optimized and to minimize the tanker aircraft’s exposure.
Notwithstanding the above three concerns, it may be possible to employ unmanned carrier-
launch airborne surveillance and strike as automated aerial refueling tankers to extend the
endurance of manned fighters. A series of Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA) flight tests in 2012 successfully demonstrated the ability to safely conduct fully
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autonomous in-flight refueling of UAVs at high-altitudes [34]. While the test utilized two
Global Hawk aircraft flying in close formation (Figure 5.2) and was conducted to validate
the concept of enabling UAVs to refuel autonomously in flight, the demonstration fuels the
impetus for the concept to be extended to employing UCLASS in the role of autonomous
aerial refueling tankers for manned fighters.
Figure 5.2: Two Global Hawks flying in close formation during DARPA’s autonomous aerial
refueling demonstration [34].
5.2 Alternative 2 - Synchronization of Asset Launch for
“Just-In-Time” Arrivals
This alternative describes the synchronized launch of assets to minimize the difference in
the assets’ arrival times at the rendezvous point. The concept is akin to the “just-in-time”
strategy developed by Toyota [35]. In that concept, the parts necessary for the assembly are
delivered to the assembly plant just when they are required. This minimizes the warehous-
ing requirements for the assembly plant drastically. When applied to the MUM-T concept,
the synchronization of the launches for manned and unmanned aircraft can be managed
such that the necessary types of aircraft arrive at the rendezvous point almost simultane-
ously. Consequently, the time required to hold at the rendezvous point to wait for the correct
combination of assets to form the MUM-T (Strike) team is consequently minimized, too.
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To analyze the effectiveness of this alternative, a modification to the expanded kill chain
model is made. Keeping the parameters of all the model elements constant, changes are
made to the Create block in the UCAV Asset Generation track. Instead of creating UCAV
items according to a Poisson distribution, the UCAVs items are generated in two waves.
Also, a delay is added to the UCAV generation to ensure that a UCAV item is only generated
after a prescribed delay time. Operationally, this means that the UCAVs are provided with
a different The specific hour on a specific dat at which a particular operation commences.
(H-Hour), as compared to that for the fighters, in their mission orders. A range of delay
times are explored. In addition to the delay, the number of items generated is also varied to
study the effect it has on the RV Times. Table 5.1 shows the range in which the two factors
are varied to determine the main effects.
Table 5.1: Factors and ranges for UCAV launch delay time effects analysis
Factor Factor range
Launch delay time 10 to 120 mins
UCAVs launched in first wave 2 to 8
A full factorial design was used to generate the combinations of scenarios to run. Twenty-
four combinations of delay times and number of UCAVs launched in the first wave was
simulated. Each design point is repeated for one hundred simulation runs. Table 5.2 shows
the twenty-four combinations.
Table 5.2: Alternative 2 – Twenty-four combinations for
simulation, 100 simulation runs each.






Continued on next page
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Table 5.2 – Continued from previous page




















The following figures present the results from the simulation runs. Figure 5.3 and Fig-
ure 5.4 shows the Pareto plot and effects plot for the two factors on RV Times, respectively.
The Pareto plot also includes the effects from the interaction between the two factors. Fig-
ure 5.5 shows the effects from the interaction between the delay in UCAV launch and the
number of UCAVs launched in the first wave.
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Figure 5.3: Pareto plot of factors on RV Times.
Figure 5.4: Effects analysis of factors on RV Times.
Figure 5.5: Prediction profiler for Mission Time with maximum desirability.
The results from the runs show that the number of UCAVs launched in the initial wave has
the largest effect. The delay in launching UCAVs also has an effect on reducing the RV
Times, but the magnitude of the effect is lower. A combination of increasing the number of
UCAVs launched in the first wave and the delay in the launch of the UCAV serve to reduce
the RV Times.
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From the interaction plot, it is evident that interactions between the launch delay and the
number of UCAVs launched in the first wave has a significant effect on the RV Times. The
interaction plots are non-parallel, indicating that there interactions between the the two
factors are significant. As observed from the interaction plots, increasing both the number
of UCAVs launched and the delay in launching of the UCAVs results in a reduction in RV
Times. Conversely, if the UCAVs initial launch is limited to only two assets, an increase in
the delay time for launch has a consequence of increasing the RV Times. Thus, to maximize
the effects on RV Times, a 120-minute delayed launch of 8 UCAVs is desired.
5.2.1 Analysis of Alternative 2
A modification of the expanded kill chain model was made to account for the delayed
launch of the UCAVs. Specifically, the Create block for the UCAV asset generation track
was changed to incorporate the delayed launch of the UCAV. For comparison, a simulation
of the simultaneous launch of UCAVs was also performed. Both simulations are ran for
simulation 100 runs and the mean RV Times obtained.
Simulation Results - RV Time
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of the RV Times obtained for the simul-
taneous launch of UCAVs and fighters (baseline model), and the delayed launch of the
UCAVs respectively. In both cases, there is one outlier observed. Investigation of the data
indicated that the outlier is a valid instance and the data point is retained for both cases.
Figure 5.6: Distribution of RV Times for a baseline simultaneous launch of UCAV and fighters
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of RV Times for a 120 minutes delayed launch of 8 UCAVs
Hypothesis Testing of Means
A t-test for test of means, assuming unequal variances, is then performed to determine if
there is a statistically significant decrease in the RV Times with the inclusion of a UCAV
launch delay. The hypotheses are defined as follows.
Ho : µ(baseline) = µ(UCAV delayed launch)
Halternative : µ(baseline) < µ(UCAV delayed launch)
where:
µ(baseline) = Mean RV Times for a simultaneous UCAV launch
µ(UCAV delayed launch) = Mean RV Times for a delayed UCAV launch
The t-test on the two sets of data is performed using JMP Pro 10 and also using the data
analysis tool kit add-in in Microsoft Excel. A two-sample t-test assuming unequal variance
is performed. Figure 5.8 shows the results of the t-test using JMP Pro 10. The results of
the t-test using Microsoft Excel is shown in Table 5.3.
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Figure 5.8: Results of two-sample assuming unequal variances t-test using JMP Pro 10. The red
vertical line indicates the difference between the means of the RV Times, while the distribution
indicates the areas where there is no statistically significant difference between the two means.
Table 5.3: Results of two-sample assuming unequal variances t-test using Microsoft Excel.
RV times(baseline) RV times(UCAV delayed launch)
Mean 124.41 mins 109.27 mins
Variance 175.33 mins 123.26mins
t Statistics 8.760
P(T ≤ t) one-tail 5.08792 ×10−16
As observed from both t-test, the p-value is extremely small. Thus, there is sufficient ev-
idence to reject the null hypothesis, Ho, that there is no difference in the mean RV Times
for a simultaneous UCAV launch and a delayed UCAV launch at an α level of 0.05. This
shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the RV Times for a simul-
taneous launch and the RV Times for a delayed UCAV launch. The delayed launching of
the UCAV by 120 minutes and a launch of all 8 UCAVs in one wave has a statistically
significant effect of reducing the RV Times.
While the study has shown that the simultaneous launch of eight UCAVs would be effective
in reducing the RV Times, the physical limitations of launching eight UCAVs simultane-
ously from a CVEX 2 must be considered. The flight deck of a CVEX 2 is unlikely to be
larger than that on the current aircraft carrier. This physically constrains the number of
UCAVs that can be launched.
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5.3 Alternative 3 - Pre-Launch Link-up
This alternative describes the establishment of data and command links (link-up) between
the fighters and UCAVs before launch. In this alternative, the CONOPS require that each
fighter perform link-up with two UCAVs as part of the asset generation process. Upon
successful link-up, the fighters and UCAVs are then launched. This is expected to reduce
the RV Times as well as the necessary airborne times for the assets. Figure 5.9 shows
the high-level operational view of this alternative. The following paragraphs describes the
sequence of operations.
Figure 5.9: MUM-T (strike) with pre-launch link-up high level operational view
Prior to launch, the fighters onboard the aircraft carrier perform a coordinated establishment
of data link and command link with the UCAVs on board the CVEX 2 (1). Upon successful
link-up of the assets, the assets are simultaneously launched from both launch platforms
and proceed to ingress covertly towards the ADIZ (2). The UCAVs continue into the ADIZ
while the fighters, performing the role of an airborne command stations, remain outside
the ADIZ. Upon reaching the targets, the UCAVs proceed to engage the targets (3). Upon
completion of target engagement, the UCAVs then egress and vector towards the fighters
outside the ADIZ. The package then returns to their respective recovery platforms (4).
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5.3.1 Analysis of Alternative 3
While this alternative is expected to significantly reduce the RV Times, and consequently
the airborne time of the assets, the aircraft carrier and CVEX 2 will likely need to be sta-
tioned close to each other to provide line of sight communications capability for the link-up.
Under the distributed air wing concept, this is undesirable. The need to maintain this line of
sight communications also places restrictions on the maneuverability of the aircraft carrier
and the CVEX 2.
To analyze the effect this alternative has on the RV Time and the Mission Time, the ex-
panded kill chain model is modified to include the establishment of data and command link
prior to launching the assets. Figure 5.10 shows the modified ExtendSim model.
Figure 5.10: ExtendSim model for Alternative 3. Note the inclusion of the link-up processes prior
to the EOR inspection and the launching of the assets.
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The main difference of the model from the baseline expanded kill chain model is the mov-
ing of the MUM-T package formation from after asset takeoff to before EOR inspection. In
this case, only after all assigned assets have completed the link-up would they be launched.
This serves to minimize the time the assets are required to be airborne. However, the
ingress and egress distance for the strike package is increased and includes the previously
assumed distance from the launch platforms to the rendezvous point. All other parameters
in the activity blocks remain consistent with that in the expanded kill chain model. For
this alternative, the RV Time is calculated as the time the first asset is ready for link-up
(simulation item reaches the “MUMT RV” block Figure 5.10)to the time the strike package
is formed (simulation item exits the “Form Strike Pkg” block in Figure 5.10). One hundred
simulation runs are made and the RV Time and Mission Time for each run is recorded.
RV Time
Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of RV Times obtained for Alternative 3. In the plot,
three outliers are observed. Investigation of the data indicated that the outliers are valid
cases and the data points are retained for the analysis.
Figure 5.11: Distribution of RV Times for Alternative 3
The distribution for the RV Times for the baseline expanded kill chain model (Figure 5.6)
shows an upper 95th percentile of 127.04-minutes. We observe from the distribution of RV
Times for Alternative 3, the mean of the RV Times is 151.10-minutes. As this is beyond
the 95th percentile of that for the baseline expanded kill chain model, it can be inferred
that the pre-launch link-up CONOPs results in a longer RV Time when compared to the
baseline expanded kill chain model. However, it is important to note that in Alternative 3,
the link-up occurs while the assets are on the launch platforms; thus the previous limiting
factor of fighter endurance will not be a constraint. In order to assess the effectiveness of
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this alternative, an analysis of the Mission Time is performed. Recall that the Mission Time
reveals the actual airborne time that is required of the assets.
Mission Time
Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 shows the distribution of Mission Times obtained for Alterna-
tive 3 and that from the baseline expanded kill chain model respectively.
Figure 5.12: Distribution of Mission Time for alternative 3. Note the upper 95th percentile of
120.14 minutes.
Figure 5.13: Distribution of Mission Time for baseline expanded kill chain model. Note the lower
95th percentile of 190.31 minutes.
With Alternative 3, the mean Mission Time achieved is 122.85 minutes or about 2 hours 3
minutes. This is lower than the mean Mission Time of 193.66 minutes achieved under the
baseline expanded kill chain model. As the upper 95th percentile for the third alternative’s
mean Mission Time is less than the lower 95th percentile of the baseline expanded kill
chain model’s mean Mission Time, it can be inferred that there is a statistically significant
reduction in mean Mission Time using Alternative 3. The results show that Alternative 3 is
able to address the previously limiting factor of fighter endurance through the modification
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of the sequencing of operational activities for a MUM-T (strike) mission. The use of fuel-
efficient flight profiles, such as flying at high altitudes for ingress and egress, by the manned
fighters may enable the manned fighters to meet the Mission Time requirements.
5.4 Pugh Method
The Pugh method [36] is a design selection methodology that allows for the comparison of
a number of design alternatives against a set of criteria. The Pugh Matrix may also enable
the illumination of hybrid alternatives that provides some form of optimization towards the
solution.
For this study, the Pugh Matrix is constructed with the criteria as rows, and the baseline
expanded kill chain model and three alternatives as columns. The baseline expanded kill
chain model is set as the datum that all alternatives are assessed against. The criteria used
are described in the following paragraphs.
5.4.1 Criteria Used in Pugh Matrix
The following criteria are used in the Pugh Matrix.
1. Total Mission Time – The total time to complete the mission, beginning from the
start of aircraft generation to the return of aircraft to the launch platforms.
2. Mission Time– The amount of time the assets are required to be airborne for the
mission.
3. RV Time – The time to complete the formation of the MUM-T (strike) package.
4. Risk to Assets – The assessed risk to both air and surface assets as well as the launch
platforms. This is a qualitative assessment.
5.4.2 Pugh Matrix Score
Each alternative will be assessed against the baseline CONOPs as described in Section
4.6, and given a score of +1, 0 or -1. A “+1” indicates that the alternative performs better
or is more desirable than the datum with respect to the criteria. A “0” indicates that the
alternative is on par with the datum with respect to the criteria. A “-1” indicates that the
alternative is inferior or less desirable to the datum with respect to the criteria.
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5.4.3 Pugh Matrix
Recall that the three alternatives are:
1. Alternative 1 – Aerial refueling tanker support at rendezvous point
2. Alternative 2 – Synchronized launch of manned and unmanned aircraft to achieve
“just-in-time” arrival at rendezvous point
3. Alternative 3 – Pre-launch link-up of manned and unmanned aircraft
Table 5.4 shows the Pugh matrix for the baseline CONOPS and the three alternatives. Re-
marks are included to provide elaboration on the scoring.
Table 5.4: Pugh matrix for baseline and alternatives
Criterion Baseline Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Remarks
Total Mission
Time
– 0 +1 +1 Alt 2 results in a reduced RV Time
and a corresponding reduction in To-
tal Mission Time. Alt 3 results in a
reduced Total Mission Time.
Mission time – 0 0 +1 Alt 3 requires the aircraft to be air-
borne for the shortest time.
RV Time – 0 +1 +1 Alt 2 results in a reduction in the RV
Time. Alt 3 removes the RV Time
from the aircraft airborne time.
Risk to assets – -1 0 -1 Alt 1 requires addition assets (tankers
and tanker escorts). Alt 3 require that
the aircraft carrier and CVEX 2 be in
close proximity for pre-launch link-
up.
Summary – -1 +2 +2
91
The Pugh matrix shows that Alternative 1 is the least favorable design solution for the
refined CONOPS. Not only does it not achieve the desired reduction in Total Mission
Time, Mission Time and RV Time, Alternative 1 results in the introduction of addition
risks as more assets, including high-value assets (aerial refueling tanker), are required.
Alternative 2 does result in a reduction in RV Times, and a corresponding reduction in
Total Mission Time. As the communications link-up between the manned and unmanned
aircraft is performed between all aircraft prior to aircraft launch, RV Times do not factor
into the mission airborne time. Doing so also reduces the Total Mission Time for alternative
3.
The Pugh matrix reveals that both Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 are possible design so-
lutions for CONOPS. However, it should be noted that Alternative 2 did not result in any
significant decrease in the Mission Time, which meant that the fighters would still be re-
quired to be airborne for an extended period of time. Alternative 3, on the other hand,
resulted in a decrease in both the Mission Time and the RV Time. However, Alternative
3 placed the launch platforms at higher risks due to the need for geographical proximity
to enable the pre-launch link-up. A possible mitigation will be to employ airborne relays
such that both launch platforms can be stationed further apart during the pre-launch link-
up. Such a relay capability can potentially be realized with a swarm network of UAVs in
operating in a rapidly deployable network (RDN) configuration.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the USN’s recent trials in integrated operations of manned and
unmanned aircraft off the aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt (CVN 71) points to a possibil-
ity that Alternative 3 may be an feasible CONOPS for the MUM-T (strike) mission. By
operating both types of aircraft on the same deck, the link-up can be performed with in-




Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
This study elucidates possible capabilities from the JCA framework that potentially can
be performed or realized by the teaming of manned and unmanned aircraft. An initial
exploration of such a teaming was performed in the distributed air wing capstone project
[16]. It was identified that a potential force multiplier could be in teaming manned and
unmanned platforms in operations. Being probably the most complex amongst the various
potential capabilities, the manned-unmanned teaming is chosen for further investigation.
Specifically, the teaming of manned and unmanned platforms in future strike operations is
studied.
This study first developed a design reference mission for a manned-unmanned team con-
ducting a strategic strike mission against surface targets. Key operational activities nec-
essary for the successful conduct of the mission were identified. From these activities,
functional analysis is performed to identify the key functions of the mission. This enabled
the identification of key processes that would be used in the modeling of the kill chain and
expanded kill chain. The kill chain and the expanded kill chain are modeled to enable the
study of the factors that affected the efficiency of the kill chains. From these models, the
following insights are illuminated.
1. An accurate target solution is critical – The study of the F2T2E kill chain model
has shown that while the weapon performance such as probability of hit and proba-
bility of kill has a direct effect on the mission success rate, the performance of the
targeting system has the largest impact. Results presented in Chapter 4, Section 4.5
show that the effect from the “probability of target” factor is twice that of the “proba-
bility of kill” and 1.5 times the “probability of hit” factors. A weapon’s effectiveness
is only as effective as the accuracy of the target information that it is supplied. Of
the five processes in the kill chain, four of them, namely, “find, fix, track and target,”
pertain to the generation of an accurate target solution.
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2. Fighter endurance is a limiting factor in manned-unmanned teaming due to the
extended time required for manned-unmanned link-up – The disproportionate
endurance between the fighters and the UCAVs presents a challenge in such teaming
operations. The results from the expanded kill chain model suggest that the limiting
factor in a MUM-T (Strike) lies in the airborne formation of the MUM-T (Strike)
package. Based on simulation of the baseline expanded kill chain simulation model,
a minimum Mission Time of 3 hours and 52 minutes is required for the completion
of the mission. Current manned fighters cannot achieve such high endurance time
without the support of aerial refueling tankers. From the simulation, a significant
amount of time is spent by either the fighter or the UCAV holding at the RV point.
This is due to the lack of synchronization in the arrival of the assets at the RV point
such that efficacy can be achieved in the airborne link up.
Three alternatives are then proposed to either increase the endurance of the fighters or
reduce the time needed to perform the link-up. Each alternative is assessed based on their
effects on the Mission Time and RV Time. Possible challenges and mitigation are also
discussed.
1. Alternative 1: Tanker support – The first alternative proposed the use of aerial re-
fueling tanker at the RV point to enable the extension of fighter endurance. This alter-
native presented several challenges and risks. Challenges were expected in mission
planning due to the need for cross-Service coordination between the strike package
and the aerial refueling tanker and tanker fighter escorts. In addition, this alterna-
tive necessitated the positioning of high value assets within the enemy counter-air
radius, which increased the risks involved in the mission. Notwithstanding, it may
be possible to employ UCLASS as automated aerial refueling tankers to extend the
endurance of manned fighters.
2. Alternative 2: Synchronization of UCAV launch for “just-in-time” arrivals –
The second alternative proposed the synchronization of manned and unmanned asset
launch to minimize the waiting time at the RV point. The alternative assumed that
UCAVs will be launched in either one or two waves, with a total of eight UCAVs
launched. Analysis of this alternative considered variations in launch time delays as
well as variations in the number of UCAVs launched in the first wave. The baseline
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model was modified to account for the delay in launch as well as the number of
UCAVs launched in each wave. Results from the modeling runs indicate that a delay
of 120-minutes and a launch of eight UCAVs in the first wave would serve to reduce
the RV Times. However, Mission Time remained largely similar for the fighters.
While this alternative is effective in reducing the RV Time, there is the challenge of
a near-simultaneous launch of eight UCAVs from a single CVEX 2.
3. Alternative 3: Pre-launch link-up – The third alternative proposed that the link-up
between the manned and unmanned systems be made prior to the systems taking off
from the launch platforms. In this alternative, there was no delay in the launch of
the UCAV. A model was developed to study the effects that a pre-launch link-up
CONOPS would have on the RV Times and Mission Times. Analysis showed that
for this alternative, RV Times was not a significant factor as it did not contribute
to the airborne time that was required of the fighters. This was because the link-
up was performed prior to the fighters taking off. Analysis of the Mission Time
showed a statistically significant reduction in the Mission Time. One challenge of this
alternative is the need for both launch platforms to be stationed in closer proximity,
thereby increasing the risk to both platforms. A possible mitigation will be to employ
airborne relays such that both launch platforms can be stationed further apart during
the pre-launch link-up. Such a relay capability can potentially be realized with a
swarm network of UAVs in operating in a RDN configuration.
This study has illuminated the potential areas on which efficiency enhancements efforts will
need to be focused when considering operations involving manned and unmanned aircraft.
Specifically, efficiencies in asset generation and the establishment of data and command
links between manned and unmanned aircraft will enhance the operational feasibility of
such strike operations. Such operations require close coordination between both manned
and unmanned aircraft, and tight integration between the unmanned operators, carrier air
wing, aircraft carrier, mission planners and the intelligence community. This study has also
illuminated areas in the expanded kill chain of a MUM-T (strike) operation that may impact
operational effectiveness, as well as identified possible tactics, concept of operations and
future capabilities that will increase the operational tenability of a team of manned and
unmanned aircraft for strike operations.
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6.2 Future Work
This study took a system engineering approach to investigate a fairly narrow scope of look-
ing at time-efficiency in the expanded kill chain for a manned-unmanned teaming strike
operation. Manned and unmanned teaming in operations introduces new frontiers and pos-
sibilities in tactics and strategies. Some insights were gained about the factors that impact
the kill chain effectiveness. In addition, variations in the asset generation and concept of
operations has an effect on the overall kill chain efficiency. However, several areas of im-
provements in the models and analysis, and new areas of study, have been identified to gain
a deeper understanding of the topic of manned and unmanned teaming.
6.2.1 Design Reference Missions
First, this study only focused on one particular capability, that of manned and unmanned
teaming. As articulated in Section 2.3, there are a diverse set of capabilities that can po-
tentially be realized by manned and unmanned teaming concepts. Future efforts could be
directed towards developing design reference missions for these capabilities. Development
of design reference missions will facilitate and enable the illumination of factors, con-
straints and challenges that should be considered when formulating concept of operations.
For example, the teaming of manned and unmanned aircraft in search and locate operations
can possibly increase the rate of area cover. Analysis could focus on the increase in search
and location effectiveness if a network of UAVs are teamed with a maritime patrol aircraft.
Various search patterns can be evaluated to determine one that is the most effective in area
coverage.
Future work may also study the impact of teaming manned and unmanned aircraft in hu-
manitarian aid and disaster relief operations. Amazon, under project Prime Air, is experi-
menting the use of mini-UAVs to deliver small parcels to their customers [37]. This concept
may be extended to the delivery of aid and relief ot inaccessible disaster areas. In the pe-
riod immediate after a natural disaster, the expeditious delivery of aid and relief to affected
areas is of high importance. Using vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAVs capable of
carrying cargo in an under-slung configuration, the effectiveness and efficiency of aid and
relief delivery can be assessed against an operation utilizing only manned aircraft.
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6.2.2 Simulation Models
Second, while the models built in this study provide sufficient depth for the objectives of
this study, they are not of sufficient fidelity whereby the results could be transferred easily
to the operational world. Future effort could build on these models and implement higher
fidelity features and parameters so that results can be better validated or verified against
real world operations. The parameters used in this study were either obtained from open
sources or based on the author’s professional experience. Ideally, the parameters used in the
models should be realistic to achieve an operationally-accurate model. However, as some
of the specifications are classified, proxy or approximate values are used. Nonetheless, the
models developed in this study provide a starting point from which modifications can be
applied to develop models of higher-fidelity and operational accuracy.
Third, recall that one of the assumptions is that each target is engaged by only one weapon.
A missed target is not re-engaged in this study. In reality, targets may be engaged by
multiple weapons in multiple passes. This process will likely increase the Mission Time
and decrease the mission success rate. Future work can study the impact this has on the
mission success rate and the constraints such a CONOPS imposed on the maximum number
of targets that can be serviced by a MUM-T strike package.
Fourth, it is also important that the simulation models are verified. No verification of the
simulation models against real world operations is done in this study as no similar strike
operations exist at present, especially in the area of communications link-up between a
manned fighter and unmanned aircraft. However, the advent of U.S. Navy flight trials for
integrated operations of manned and unmanned aircraft onboard the aircraft carrier presents
opportunities to verify and validate the model.
Fifth, the kill chain for a UAV strike may be more complex than those that were mentioned
in this study. For example, while a majority of the processes in the kill chain will likely
be automated, humans will likely perform the final process of engagement. In addition,
prior to the engagement, there will most likely be a requirement for a human to assess the
legitimacy of the target. This additional decision-making process is not modeled in this
study, but should be investigated further to better understand the constraints and challenges
it might place on the overall kill chain execution. Future efforts may wish to investigate
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the threats to the successful engagement of the targets. For example, due to the need for a
visual verification of the target prior to weapons release, the video link would be a mission
critical system and also a potential single-point of failure. Future researchers could explore
alternative links and the requisite bandwidth to ensure that the successful engagement of
the target is not compromised due to a failure in the video link.
Sixth, in this study, the triangular distribution is used to model the time required for the per-
formance of asset generation activities as the minimum, maximum and median cycle times
for such activities can be intuitively defined. Johnson [38] showed that there was no signifi-
cant difference in the use of a more intuitively obvious triangular distribution as a proxy for
the beta distribution. While cycle time data for asset generation for both the manned fighter
and UCAV, in the case of this study, the F-35 Lightning II and X-47B respectively, are un-
available at the time of this study as both aircraft are not operationally fielded at present,
estimation of the maximum, minimum and median are made using operational platforms.
Future work may wish to consider the use of beta distribution as modeling parameters for
the asset generation cycle times.
6.2.3 Future Concepts
Seventh, the study of using UCLASS as aerial refueling tankers for manned fighters as
discussed in Section 5.1.1 can be explored. While this still means that additional resources
will need to be committed to the operation, the use of unmanned aerial refueling tankers
significantly reduces the risk to human lives operating in highly contested airspace. In
addition, future work can look into the operational and safety considerations of such a
concept. The study into the use of UAVs as aerial refueling platforms may also illuminate
any unique design requirements. For example, researchers could explore control system
design requirements for UAVs to perform close formation flying.
Eighth, previous examples of manned-unmanned teaming operations involved two or more
operators onboard the control platform. In this study, the additional workload to the pilot
in having to control two unmanned aircraft is not considered. However, it is reasonable that
the workload of the fighter pilot will increase and it is likely that this increase will result in
some degradation of the pilot’s performance.
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6.2.4 Stealth
Ninth, both the manned and unmanned aircraft used in this study are VLO aircraft. Recall
that one of the assumptions is that there will be no defensive counter-air launched against
the strike package due to the package’s stealth capabilities. This stealth capability enables
the package to covertly ingress and egress the area of operations whilst avoiding detection
by air defense radars. To this end, future research could study the impact and multiplier
effects of stealth toward the success of a manned-unmanned teaming. For example, the
effectiveness of teaming a non-stealth manned fighter with a stealthy UCAV could be in-
vestigated and if such teaming necessitates the development and employment of unique
TTPs.
6.2.5 Threats
Lastly, this study assumed that due to the VLO characteristics of the UCAVs and the
manned fighters, no enemy defensive counter-air is considered. The UCAVs are able to
covertly ingress toward the target and deploy their weapons while avoiding detection. There
should be a study of the presence of enemy defensive counter-air and its impact to both the
Mission Times and mission success rates.
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